No Motivation? Why Willpower Isn’t Working

No Motivation? Why Willpower Isn’t Working

You sit down to do the thing you have been negotiating with yourself about all day. You open the laptop, you stare at the email, you reread the instructions, you promise yourself you will start in five minutes, and then somehow you do anything except the thing. Later, when the day has slipped away, the explanation arrives with the familiar bluntness: “I have no motivation.”

If you recognize that line, you probably also recognize what follows it: the quiet self-contempt, the attempt to “get serious,” the vow to try harder, and the strange experience of watching your willpower evaporate the moment it matters. People often call this laziness, but laziness is usually a story we tell when we do not yet have a better one, and the problem with that story is that it treats your mind like a single unified engine that should start when you turn the key.

Existential psychoanalysis starts from a different premise, one that is both less flattering and more accurate: we are rarely of one mind, and motivation is often what a person feels when their divided wishes happen to align for a while. When they do not align, “no motivation to do anything” can be the surface description of a deeper conflict, including the kind of conflict that has been running your life for years while you keep calling it a character defect.

Close-up of thick ropes tightly knotted together, combining red and beige strands with a soft sunset in the background, symbolizing tension, complexity, and emotional entanglement

The “I should be able to make myself do it” trap

The willpower narrative is seductively simple because it promises a straightforward cure. If the issue is discipline, then the solution is to apply more pressure, to become stricter, to moralize yourself into movement. That approach sometimes works in the short term, especially when fear is high and the consequences are immediate, but it often produces a bitter loop in the long term because it turns everyday difficulty into an indictment of who you are.

There is also a hidden payoff in this narrative, which is why it sticks: if the problem is that you are defective, then you do not have to ask what you are avoiding, what you are protecting, or what you might lose if you actually change. The language of failure can function as a kind of cover, because it keeps you focused on your performance and away from the meaning of your resistance.

Willpower is not one thing

In M. Guy Thompson’s work on the will, he draws a distinction that is easy to miss and hard to unsee once you notice it: we talk about “will” as if it means conscious control, yet many of the forces that move us, and stop us, do not originate in conscious control at all. If you have been asking “why can’t I motivate myself,” it may help to notice that you might be demanding something from the will that the will was never designed to deliver.

The popular myth: will as conscious control

This is the cultural ideal most of us inherit. You decide. You commit. You execute. You keep your feelings in the background, you override resistance, and you make yourself do what you know is right. In this picture, willpower is a clean tool, and failure is evidence of weakness, immaturity, or some missing virtue.

The problem is not that this model is entirely false. The problem is that it is partial, and we treat it as total. It describes what happens when a person already wants what they are about to do, or when the costs are tolerable, or when the social pressure is strong enough to carry them, but it becomes cruel when applied to situations in which desire and fear are pulling in opposite directions.

The harder truth: desire and resistance can run the show

Thompson’s point, stated bluntly, is that we routinely overestimate conscious control, and we tend to misread the will as a simple command when, in lived experience, it is closer to the shifting, often unconscious, movement of desire. You do not simply pick your desires in the way you pick an item off a menu, and in the most human areas of life you can feel, with unnerving clarity, that your desires choose you.

One way Thompson illustrates this, in his writing on love and loss, is by pointing out something most people know but rarely say out loud: you cannot will yourself to love someone you do not love, and you cannot simply will yourself to stop loving someone you do. That is not a romantic slogan. It is a statement about how limited conscious will is when it collides with the deeper structures of attachment, longing, and fear, and it is part of why self-command so often fails in the very places where you most want it to succeed.

Motivation problems often live in the same territory. You can want to apply for the job and dread the exposure it brings. You can want to write the dissertation and fear the moment it becomes real enough to be judged. You can want to leave a relationship and panic at the loneliness that would follow. You can even want therapy and feel an inexplicable resistance the moment you go to schedule it, as if some part of you understands that being known comes with a cost.

From the outside, this looks like self sabotage psychology. From the inside, it often feels like a stalemate: one part of you insists you should act, another part insists you should not, and the result gets named “no motivation,” even though what you are experiencing is a conflict that has turned into inertia.

The hidden cost of change

Most “motivation” advice assumes the obstacle is fear of failure, as if all you need is confidence and better habits. Sometimes it is that, but often the deeper obstacle is that change threatens to reorganize your life, which means it threatens to reorganize your loyalties, your identity, and your excuses.

People avoid what they want for reasons that make psychological sense once you stop moralizing them. Success makes you visible, which means it makes you accountable, and accountability can feel like danger if you grew up in a world where being seen brought criticism, envy, or intrusion. Growth can disrupt an old role you have played for a family or a partner, the reliable one, the one who stays small, the one who keeps the peace, and the prospect of stepping out of that role can evoke guilt that feels, irrationally but powerfully, like betrayal.

Sometimes the cost is grief. If you finally act, you may have to face the time you lost, the ways you have settled, the ways you have been living as if you had no choice, and for some people that grief is so sharp that procrastination becomes a way to avoid it. Sometimes the cost is responsibility. If you move, you lose the comfort of being able to say “I couldn’t,” and you enter the harsher territory of “I chose,” which is exactly where freedom begins and where self-deception becomes harder to maintain.

If you have been wondering “why do I procrastinate so much,” or noticing the tight link between procrastination and anxiety, this is one reason: anxiety is often the body’s signal that the stakes are higher than the conscious story admits.

Acceptance and change are not enemies

In popular self-help culture, acceptance is treated as the opposite of change, as if accepting yourself means giving up, lowering standards, or resigning yourself to a smaller life. Thompson’s writing takes a different angle, one that can feel counterintuitive until you notice it in your own experience: change that lasts is rarely produced by self-attack, and it is often blocked, not by lack of effort, but by refusal to accept what is actually true about your experience.

In his writing on acceptance in the context of loss, he emphasizes how difficult it is to “move on” when you remain organized around a fantasy that the situation will resolve without requiring you to bear its consequences, and he treats acceptance less as a moral stance and more as the final step in recovery, the point at which the person stops bargaining with reality and begins to live again. The implication for motivation is not that you should resign yourself to avoidance, but that you should stop lying to yourself about why you are stuck, because the lie keeps the conflict frozen in place.

This is also why many people feel that willpower fails precisely when they most want to change. You can use discipline to force a behavior for a while, but you cannot use discipline to dissolve the meanings and fears that make the behavior feel dangerous, and until those meanings are faced, the “no motivation” experience tends to return, often in a new disguise.

The existential turn: avoidance is still a choice

Existential therapy has a way of making people bristle, and sometimes it should, because it insists on taking freedom seriously. The uncomfortable truth is that avoidance is not nothing. Even when it is not fully conscious, it is a way of choosing relief now over the risk of change, and that choice has consequences that accumulate quietly until your life begins to feel smaller than it needs to be.

This is not a blame move. It is a dignity move. If you are not a broken machine, then you are a person making tradeoffs, often under pressure, often out of loyalty to strategies that once protected you, and the task is not to shame those strategies but to understand them well enough that you can decide whether they still deserve to run your life.

Many people discover that their “no motivation” problem is also a meaning problem, because meaning creates exposure, and exposure creates fear, and fear invites withdrawal. When you keep withdrawing, desire starts to feel distant, not because it vanished, but because you have learned to live at a safer distance from the things that would make your life feel real.

Bulletin board with a ‘TO-DO LIST’ sticky note listing tasks like starting a project and going to the gym, connected by a tangled mess of colorful strings to a pink note labeled ‘AVOIDANCE’, symbolizing procrastination and inner conflict

What therapy can do when willpower fails

If you are searching “therapy for procrastination,” you are probably not looking for a cheerleader, and you are probably tired of being told to make a schedule. Depth-oriented work approaches procrastination, avoidance, and self sabotage as expressions of conflict that deserve interpretation, not as a simple skills deficit.

In existential therapy, the conversation often returns to the questions you may have been avoiding because they feel too large or too unsettling: What do you actually want, not what you think you should want? What are you afraid will happen if you go after it? What would you have to give up, and what would you have to take responsibility for, if you stopped living in delay? The work is not about providing easy answers; it is about staying close to your experience long enough that it stops being an enemy and becomes information. If you want to learn more about our approach, see existential therapy

In psychoanalysis, the emphasis includes the unconscious patterns that shape your emotions, relationships, and decisions, including the ways you “act against your own desires” without fully understanding why. This is not about digging for trivia from childhood; it is about seeing how old solutions keep repeating in the present, how your mind organizes itself around safety and loyalty, and how the therapeutic relationship itself becomes a place where these patterns can be felt, named, and worked through rather than reenacted. If you want to learn more about our approach, see psychoanalysis

Both approaches share a commitment that is not especially fashionable: real change tends to happen indirectly, over time, through honesty and relationship, because once you understand what your resistance is protecting, you no longer need to treat yourself like a project that must be forced into submission.

When “no motivation” has become a pattern: If you are tired of blaming yourself and want a deeper explanation of what is happening, you can schedule a first session. If you are trying to figure out costs, coverage, or superbills, you can also learn about insurance and superbills.

How “no motivation” shows up in real life

People rarely walk into therapy saying “I am conflicted about desire, freedom, and responsibility,” even when that is exactly what is happening. What they say is simpler and more painful: they cannot start, they cannot finish, they wait until panic arrives, they overthink until the window closes, they feel a strange competence when doing things for other people and a strange paralysis when doing things for themselves, they know what matters and then avoid it as if meaning itself were dangerous. Sometimes perfectionism is the cover, because if you require certainty before you act, you can postpone the risk of exposure indefinitely; sometimes distraction becomes compulsive, because it offers momentary relief from the fear that rises the moment you approach what you want.

None of this proves a diagnosis. It does suggest that “no motivation” is often a shorthand for an internal arrangement that has been protecting you, and that the arrangement has started to cost more than it gives.

What a first session focuses on

A first session is not a performance review, and it is not a test of whether you are “motivated enough” to deserve help. It is a place to describe what is happening without having to defend yourself, and to begin identifying the structure of the pattern rather than arguing with its moral meaning.

In practical terms, we listen for how you describe your stuckness, what you say you want, what you fear will happen if you move toward it, and what you are currently getting from staying where you are, even if you hate it. We also pay attention to how this pattern shows up in work, in love, and in your relationship to authority, including your own inner authority, because “no motivation” is often not a standalone problem but a style of relating to desire and responsibility.

If you want a clearer sense of our stance and our clinical orientation, you can read more about how we work. If you decide not to continue after the first meeting, your first session is free; if you do decide to continue, we discuss payment and next steps during the session.

Wooden signpost at a forked path with arrows pointing in opposite directions labeled ‘WILLPOWER’ and ‘DESIRE’, overlaid with transparent silhouettes of two human profiles facing each other, representing internal struggle and decision-making.

FAQ

Why do I have no motivation even for things I care about?
Because caring raises the stakes. When something matters, it can expose you to disappointment, judgment, regret, or change in your relationships, and the mind often prefers safety to meaning when it feels cornered. In that situation, what looks like “no motivation” may be your system applying the brakes to avoid a cost you have not fully named.

Is it laziness, or is something actually wrong with me?
“Lazy” is usually an insult, not an explanation. Low motivation can be shaped by burnout, depression, grief, chronic stress, medical issues, and attention-related factors, and it can also be an existential problem, a conflict about freedom, responsibility, and desire. A careful clinical conversation is often the quickest way to sort out what is most true in your case, because different causes require different kinds of help.

Why do I procrastinate more when something matters?
Because meaning creates exposure. When the outcome matters, you are no longer just completing a task, you are making a claim about who you are and what you are willing to risk. Procrastination can be the mind’s attempt to postpone that claim, especially when anxiety is high.

Why do I avoid things I want?
Because wanting is not only desire, it is vulnerability. Wanting puts you in contact with dependency, hope, and the possibility of loss, and for many people those experiences have been historically dangerous. Avoidance is often the compromise between desire and fear, and it becomes habitual when it works too well.

How do I stop self sabotaging relationships?
“Self sabotage” often makes more sense when you treat it as self-protection that has outlived its usefulness. In relationships, people commonly sabotage closeness when closeness threatens their identity, activates guilt, or awakens old expectations about what intimacy costs. Therapy helps you recognize the moment the pattern turns on, understand what it is trying to prevent, and gradually expand your capacity to tolerate closeness without needing to destroy it.

Can therapy help with procrastination and motivation?
Yes, especially when the work goes beyond tools and gets into meaning. Skills can help, but if the pattern is rooted in conflict, then the deeper work is to understand what is being avoided, what is at stake, and what kind of life you are implicitly choosing when you keep delaying. That understanding tends to loosen the internal stalemate, which is where motivation often returns, not as a pep-talk feeling, but as a steadier willingness to bear the costs of change.

Do you offer telehealth, and do you take insurance?
We offer in-person sessions in San Francisco and telehealth. We are in-network with Aetna, Blue Shield of California, Blue Cross Blue Shield, Optum / UnitedHealthcare, and Cigna / Evernorth, and we can also provide superbills for out-of-network reimbursement when applicable. For details, see: https://freeassociationclinic.com/insurance/

How do I get started?
You can schedule a first session here, and we will help you find a good fit. We do not promise outcomes, but we do take the problem seriously, and we treat your experience as meaningful rather than as a personal failure.

Ready to get to the heart of the matter?

If “no motivation” has become a daily argument with yourself, that is often a sign the problem is deeper than discipline. The goal is not to become a harsher manager of your own life; the goal is to understand the conflict that makes you stall, and to develop a more honest relationship with what you want, what you fear, and what you are willing to risk.

When you are ready, you can schedule a first session. If you want to clarify insurance, superbills, or out-of-network reimbursement, you can also learn about insurance and superbills.

Why Your Therapist Sometimes Doesn’t Give Advice

Why Your Therapist Sometimes Doesn’t Give Advice

If you’ve found yourself typing “why won’t my therapist give advice” into a search bar, you’re probably not looking for a philosophy lecture. You’re looking for traction. You’re in a situation where the stakes feel real, where the cost of getting it wrong feels high, and where you want someone to simply tell you what you cannot yet tell yourself, whether you should leave, stay, confront, wait, apologize, walk away, stop, start, risk, or protect what you have left.
And then, in the middle of that urgency, you meet a particular kind of response: not a verdict, not a plan, but a question, or a pause, or a shift toward what you are feeling rather than what you “should” do.

That can be infuriating. It can also feel strangely personal, as if the therapist is withholding out of coldness, indifference, or some private need to stay above the mess. In ordinary life, care often arrives packaged as advice, and when we are anxious or exhausted we can experience advice as the most basic form of kindness, because it temporarily releases us from uncertainty.

But existential and psychoanalytic therapy often works from a more skeptical view of help, one that is wary of the quiet kind of control that can hide inside “helping,” and wary too of the idea that psychological change is primarily produced by instruction. Free Association Clinic’s public language makes this orientation plain: the aim is not simply symptom management, but getting to the heart of the matter, in a way that helps you uncover meaning and reclaim what has become elusive in your life. (Free Association Clinic)

So the question is not simply whether your therapist gives advice. The deeper question is what the therapy is trying to protect when it does not, and what it risks when it does, because neutrality is not a gimmick and not a ban on human response. It is a mindset, and like any mindset it can be practiced well or poorly.

A woman gestures with uncertainty while talking to a therapist, with large question marks subtly layered over the background to suggest emotional confusion.

When you want an answer and you get a question

Most people come to therapy at least partly because the mind can become a closed room under pressure. You circle the same argument, you rehearse the same conversation in your head, you reach for the same solution that has failed before, and the repetition itself starts to feel like proof that you are stuck. When you finally bring that stuckness into the room, it is natural to want the therapist to act like an exit sign.

But a good question can do something advice cannot. It can return you to the part of the problem that is genuinely yours, which is not the part where you want the discomfort removed, but the part where you are divided, where you want two incompatible things, where you are trying to preserve love without risking loss, or preserve safety without feeling dead, or preserve self-respect without being alone.

In that sense, the therapist’s restraint is not meant to be passive. It is meant to keep your life in your hands.

If you want the broader frame FAC uses for this kind of work, start here: our approach to existential therapy

Neutrality is not the same as silence

In everyday language, neutrality can sound like a therapist who stays quiet, or a therapist who refuses to react. In classical psychoanalysis, though, neutrality points to something more demanding: an effort to engage without turning the session into an evaluation, without deciding too quickly what is important and what is trivial, what is respectable and what is shameful, what should be emphasized and what should be dismissed.

Freud’s phrase “evenly suspended attention” is useful here because it names a discipline of listening that is not ruled by the therapist’s preferences, impatience, or moral instincts. When neutrality is practiced well, it creates a particular condition in the room: you can say the thing you were bracing for judgment about, and instead of being corrected or steered into a preferred narrative, you are met with a serious kind of attention that makes truth more speakable.

That matters because people rarely hide their truth only out of secrecy. More often they hide because they expect evaluation, or they have learned that being fully honest will cost them love, status, belonging, or dignity. Neutrality is one way the therapist tries to reduce that cost, not by pretending everything is fine, but by refusing to moralize your inner life.

This is also why neutrality cannot be reduced to a rule like “the therapist never gives advice.” Neutrality is not an algorithm. It is a stance that asks a more difficult question, again and again: what is my talking, or my restraint, in service of right now, and is it serving the patient’s freedom, or is it serving my need to be effective, admired, reassuring, or in control.

Neutrality also should not be confused with indifference. A therapist can be engaged, warm, and emotionally present while still refusing to turn the session into a performance for approval, or a lecture on how to live. FAC’s own framing leans toward this kind of human seriousness: someone you can trust, who can stay with the pain of the human condition without turning you into a project. (Free Association Clinic)

Why a therapist may hold back from advice

There are practical reasons a therapist may be cautious about advice, and they have less to do with being mysterious and more to do with what advice can do to the relationship and to your agency.

Advice can be relieving, but it can also be misleading, because it often treats the surface dilemma as the real dilemma. You can ask, “Should I break up?” and receive a plausible answer, while the deeper problem remains untouched: why you choose the people you choose, what you are repeating, what you cannot bear to want, what you cannot tolerate losing, what you call love when it is really fear, what you call independence when it is really withdrawal. Advice may solve the moment while leaving the pattern intact.

Advice can also invite a subtle displacement of responsibility. If you do what the therapist says and it goes badly, the therapy can quietly become a court case. If you do not do what the therapist says, the therapy can quietly become a struggle over authority. Either way, the work gets pulled away from your desire and toward the therapist’s position.

This is where Thompson’s critique of “therapeutic ambition” matters. Therapeutic ambition is not the desire to be helpful. It is the therapist’s belief that they know what is good or bad for you in a way that licenses them to shape you accordingly, which turns help into a form of authorship. The danger is not advice itself. The danger is advice that carries the therapist’s private certainty about who you should be.

Neutrality is one way of refusing that certainty.

A calm and softly lit therapy room scene shows a pen resting on a closed journal, next to a box of tissues and a glass of water on a wooden table.

When advice is offered, it should not replace your responsibility

It is worth saying plainly: sometimes therapists do give advice. Sometimes safety is involved. Sometimes resources are needed. Sometimes a practical obstacle is blocking the work. Sometimes couples therapy or crisis-oriented work requires more structure and more direct intervention than individual depth therapy.
The issue is not whether advice ever appears. The issue is what kind of thing advice is treated as.

In existential and psychoanalytic therapy, advice is not usually seen as the catalyst for change, because lasting change rarely comes from being told what to do. It comes from coming into contact with what you actually want, what you actually fear, what you keep sacrificing, what you keep repeating, and what you keep calling “circumstances” when it is also your own participation in your life.

So when advice is offered in a depth-oriented relationship, it should feel less like instruction and more like a natural expression of helpfulness within a relationship that still refuses to bypass the central task: discovering your own desire and taking responsibility for your choices. In other words, help is allowed, but it is offered in a way that keeps the burden of authorship where it belongs, with you.

If that sounds demanding, it is, and it is also respectful. It assumes you are not a child in need of direction. It assumes you are a person trying to regain contact with yourself.

How this connects to neutrality and “non-judgment”

Many people hear “non-judgmental” and imagine a therapist who approves of everything, or who refuses to have a point of view. Neutrality is not approval. It is not permissiveness. It is an effort to keep the therapist’s evaluative reflex from becoming the governing force in the room, so that the patient’s truth can become clearer rather than immediately organized around what will earn praise or avoid disapproval.

That is why neutrality is bigger than advice. A therapist can give advice and still remain neutral in the relevant sense, if the advice is not carrying moral verdicts and not attempting to form the patient in the therapist’s image. A therapist can also refuse advice and still violate neutrality, if the refusal is used as a power move, or as a way of avoiding real engagement.

The question, again, is not “Did my therapist tell me what to do?” The question is “Is my therapist helping me face my life as mine, without condemnation and without takeover?”

A notepad labeled “Advice” with action steps sits beside another labeled “Thoughts” with introspective questions, symbolizing the contrast between external guidance and inner reflection

A practical check: when neutrality is working, it feels like thinking is possible again

When neutrality is working, many people notice something simple but profound: they start thinking again, in a way that is not just rumination. They become more honest about their motives. They catch themselves repeating patterns earlier. They feel less compelled to perform for approval, including the therapist’s approval. They begin to tolerate uncertainty long enough to find the real problem, rather than prematurely solving a substitute problem.

When neutrality is not working, the room goes dead, or you feel chronically shamed, or you feel emotionally stranded in a way that never becomes meaningful. In those cases, the right move is not to silently endure. The right move is often to say it plainly, in the room, and see what happens.

If you are looking for therapy that takes meaning, honesty, and responsibility seriously, Free Association Clinic offers existential psychotherapy and psychoanalysis, with in-person sessions in San Francisco and telehealth options described across service pages.

Schedule a first session: https://freeassociationclinic.com/contact-us/
Learn about insurance and superbills: https://freeassociationclinic.com/insurance/

How Free Association Clinic approaches this stance

FAC describes its work as existential psychotherapy and psychoanalysis, oriented toward uncovering meaning behind struggles and restoring what can feel lost in life, including passion, love, and joy.

In practice, that means the therapist is not primarily trying to direct your life from the outside; they are trying to stay close enough to your experience, and steady enough in their attention, that you can begin to see what you are doing, what you are avoiding, what you are protecting, and what you are asking of other people without realizing it.

If you want the clinic’s overview pages, use:

how we work / introduction: https://freeassociationclinic.com/introduction/
existential therapy: https://freeassociationclinic.com/existential-therapy/
psychoanalysis therapy: https://freeassociationclinic.com/psychoanalysis-therapy/
our staff: https://freeassociationclinic.com/about-us/

Practical details and insurance

FAC’s insurance page states the clinic is in-network with: Aetna, Blue Shield of California, Blue Cross Blue Shield, Optum / UnitedHealthcare, and Cigna / Evernorth, and also offers superbills for out-of-network reimbursement.

Details: https://freeassociationclinic.com/insurance/

Common questions

Should my therapist ever give advice?
Sometimes, yes, especially for safety, crisis steps, or practical barriers that need to be addressed. The bigger distinction is whether advice is being used to replace your responsibility, or whether it is offered as a human form of help inside a relationship that still returns authorship to you.

Does neutrality mean my therapist has no feelings?
No. Neutrality is not emotional emptiness. It is the effort not to use the therapist’s feelings to steer your life, punish you, rescue you, or recruit you into their values. Therapy can be very human, and it should still feel like someone is with you.

Why is my therapist so quiet?
Sometimes quiet is a way of making room for your experience rather than filling the space with the therapist’s preferences. But quiet should not become a weapon, and neutrality should not require you to endure emotional absence. If the quiet feels abandoning, say so.

How do I know if therapy is working if I am not getting answers?
In depth work, progress often shows up as increased honesty, sharper awareness of your patterns, and a stronger capacity to tolerate uncertainty without collapsing into avoidance or impulsive action. Over time, you find yourself living the same life in a different way, with more self-knowledge and less self-deception.

What if I want a more directive approach?
That is legitimate. Some people want skills-first or structured treatment, and sometimes that is exactly what is needed. Fit matters. A mismatch can feel like failure when it is really a mismatch of method.

Ready to start?

If you are ready to begin, you can request an appointment here

People Pleasing and Losing Yourself

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People Pleasing and Losing Yourself

You agree to something you do not want, and what makes it painful is that you can hear yourself consenting as it happens. You say yes with a tone that sounds sincere, because part of you is sincere: you want the other person to stay pleased, you want the relationship to stay stable, and you want the moment to pass without consequence.

Then you are alone and the consequence arrives anyway, not as drama, but as something duller and more corrosive: irritation, dread, a low-grade anger with nowhere obvious to go, followed by the familiar question that is not really a question at all. Why did I do that again?

If you recognize this pattern, you have probably been told to set better boundaries. Sometimes that advice is accurate, but it often feels thin because it is aimed at the surface of the problem; it treats people pleasing as a skill deficit when, for many people, it is closer to a way of existing with other people, a posture toward life that can look like kindness from the outside and feel like self-erasure from the inside.

A woman sits solemnly on a bed holding a white mask, surrounded by crumpled tissues, symbolizing emotional vulnerability and hidden identity.

The private aftermath is the truth of the pattern

People pleasing is usually not the presence of generosity. It is the presence of a bargain.

The bargain is rarely stated out loud, which is part of why it keeps operating. It tends to sound like this: if you are disappointed in me, I am not safe; if you are angry, I have done something wrong; if you withdraw approval, I might lose you; if I ask for what I want, I will be exposed in a way I cannot tolerate. When that bargain is running, the yes is not really about your desire, and it is not even about your values; it is about managing the other person’s reaction so you can keep your footing.

Resentment follows for a simple reason. You are spending your life stabilizing the emotional weather around you, and even when you succeed, you succeed at the cost of disappearing. The anger is not a character flaw; it is often the part of you that still knows you traded yourself away for peace.

When kindness becomes self-loss

There is a version of people pleasing that is simply social intelligence, the ordinary tact of living among others. But the kind that leaves you resentful and unreal tends to have a different texture: it feels compulsory, and it keeps widening until it is no longer confined to a few situations. You begin to notice that you adapt before you think, that you apologize for taking up time or space, that you do not know what you want until you are finally alone, that you can sense what everyone else needs while your own desire feels quiet, distant, or embarrassing.

This is the moment many people say, “I don’t know who I am.” It can sound melodramatic until you take it seriously, at which point it becomes a precise description of what has happened: your life has become organized around being acceptable, and acceptability is not the same as being real.

When kindness becomes self-loss

There is a version of people pleasing that is simply social intelligence, the ordinary tact of living among others. But the kind that leaves you resentful and unreal tends to have a different texture: it feels compulsory, and it keeps widening until it is no longer confined to a few situations. You begin to notice that you adapt before you think, that you apologize for taking up time or space, that you do not know what you want until you are finally alone, that you can sense what everyone else needs while your own desire feels quiet, distant, or embarrassing.

This is the moment many people say, “I don’t know who I am.” It can sound melodramatic until you take it seriously, at which point it becomes a precise description of what has happened: your life has become organized around being acceptable, and acceptability is not the same as being real.

Authenticity is not a trait, and it is not a hidden object

From an existential psychoanalytic view, authenticity is not a stable personality feature that you either possess or lack, and it is not a pure “true self” waiting underneath your social roles like a buried treasure. Authenticity is a way of existing, which means it is something you appropriate in the middle of real life, and it is something you can lose again and again, especially when you begin living by public opinion, by others’ expectations, and by the quiet tyranny of what you imagine you are supposed to be.

This matters clinically because it changes what you are trying to do. If you keep waiting to discover a ready-made identity, you may never do the harder work of taking up your own life in the presence of other people, where the risks are real and the consequences are not imaginary.

People pleasing is one of the most efficient ways to avoid that work, because if you become what others want, you never have to find out what you want; you can remain socially successful while privately absent.

A woman appears cheerful as she speaks to her reflection in a shattered mirror, which shows a somber expression, illustrating a divide between outward expression and inner truth.

Winnicott’s false self, or the self that keeps the relationship safe

Winnicott gives language that many people recognize immediately once they hear it, because it names the lived experience rather than offering advice. He described a false self that develops when a person learns, often early, that spontaneity is risky, that certain feelings are not welcome, and that the safest way to stay connected is to present what the other person can tolerate.

This false self is not simply “fake.” At its best, it is protective and socially useful; it helps you navigate a world that requires adaptation. In the best of cases, it can be a means by which a more intimate relationship is reached. The trouble begins when the false self becomes your primary way of being, when it stops serving you and starts running you, because then your life becomes a performance built around maintaining connection and avoiding rupture. However, the connection it affords is a catch 22, the relationship might be stable, but it is based on a lack of intimacy. You may look functional and agreeable while feeling internally strained, resentful, empty, or strangely unreal, as if you are living through a socially acceptable version of yourself while something more alive stays hidden, not because it is mystical, but because it has learned it is safer not to appear.

People pleasing often fits this picture with uncomfortable accuracy. It is compliance in the service of attachment, and it is frequently fueled by the fear that if you stop being good, you will stop being loved.

The paradox of being liked

People pleasing is often praised, and that praise can become part of the trap. If everyone experiences you as easy, reasonable, helpful, thoughtful, then the role hardens into identity, and identity becomes a kind of prison because you start defending the image you have created. You become allergic to disappointing people, not only because you fear their anger, but because their disappointment threatens the self you have built to survive.

The paradox is that the more you specialize in being liked, the harder it is to feel known, and the harder it is to feel real. Being liked can function like an invisibility cloak: you avoid conflict, and by avoiding conflict you avoid the moments that require you to take a stand, to state a preference, to risk being misunderstood, to tolerate someone’s frustration, and to remain present anyway.

Why advice fails, and what therapy changes

Most people pleasers already know the advice. They can recite it, sometimes with impressive sophistication. Yet when they attempt to follow it, something inside them reacts as if a boundary is not a sentence but a threat. That reaction is the point. It tells you that the pattern is not maintained by ignorance, but by fear, and fear does not yield to checklists.

Psychoanalytic and existential therapy take seriously that people pleasing often began as adaptation. It may have been how you kept connection, reduced threat, stayed in good standing, or found a place for yourself in a family or culture where approval felt conditional. Even when your current life is safer, the old bargain can remain in force, and the false self can keep doing its job long after it stops protecting you.

Therapy matters here because the problem is relational, and therefore the work has to become relational too. The impulse to be the “good patient,” to make the therapist comfortable, to hide anger, to soften your language, to say what you think is expected, to stay agreeable at the very moment you are not agreeable, is not a distraction from the treatment; it is often the treatment, because it allows the false self to become visible as it is happening, and it allows you to experiment with a different way of being in a relationship where the stakes are real but the goal is not approval.

In existential work, authenticity is not comfort; it is exposure. It is the willingness to let your desire, your anger, your limits, your grief, and your ambivalence be part of the relationship, not because you want conflict, but because a life without that truth is not a life you can actually inhabit.

Learn more about existential therapy: https://freeassociationclinic.com/existential-therapy/
Learn more about psychoanalytic therapy: https://freeassociationclinic.com/psychoanalysis-therapy/

A woman sits in silence at a table while faded, overlapping figures around her appear engaged in conversation, representing isolation amidst social noise.

Starting at Free Association Clinic

If your yes is keeping the peace while your private life fills with resentment, you do not need a more optimized personality. You need a different relationship to fear, guilt, and responsibility, and you need a place where the part of you that has been managing everyone else can stop performing long enough for something more genuine to appear.

Free Association Clinic offers in-person sessions in San Francisco and telehealth across California.

Request an appointment: https://freeassociationclinic.com/contact-us/
How we work / our staff: https://freeassociationclinic.com/about-us/

Insurance and practical logistics

The clinic is in-network with Aetna, Blue Shield of California, Blue Cross Blue Shield, Optum / UnitedHealthcare, and Cigna / Evernorth. If your plan is not listed, out-of-network reimbursement may still apply, and the clinic can provide a superbill.

Learn about insurance and superbills: https://freeassociationclinic.com/insurance/

Consultation: your first session is free if you choose not to continue. If you decide to move forward, payment is discussed during the meeting.

FAQ

Is people pleasing the same as being kind?
No. Kindness can include honesty and limits, and it can tolerate another person’s disappointment. People pleasing is often organized around safety and approval, which is why it can feel like care on the outside while feeling like disappearance on the inside.

Why do I feel resentful after I people please?
Because the relationship stayed calm, but it stayed calm by costing you something. Resentment is often the aftertaste of self-erasure, especially when you agreed out of fear rather than desire.

Why do I feel guilty when I set a boundary?
Because guilt can be the emotional price of breaking an old rule, even when the rule is destroying your life slowly. Guilt does not always mean you harmed someone; sometimes it means you stopped conforming.

Is people pleasing a trauma response?
Sometimes. Sometimes it is a learned adaptation to conditional approval, volatile relationships, or environments where being low-maintenance was the safest role. The label matters less than understanding what your people pleasing protects and what it costs.

What if I don’t even know what I want?
That is common, and it often makes sense. If the false self has been steering for years, desire can go quiet. Therapy can help you recover it without forcing quick answers, and without treating your life like a self-improvement project.

Schedule a first session: https://freeassociationclinic.com/contact-us/

Repetition Compulsion: Why You Keep Repeating the Same Patterns Even With Insight

Repetition Compulsion: Why You Keep Repeating the Same Patterns Even With Insight

You can tell the whole story.

You know where it started. You can name the theme. You can predict what you’re about to do next.

And then you do it anyway.

Same relationship, different face. Same shutdown when conflict becomes real. Same overwork until you feel hollow. Same promise that this time will be different, followed by the same quiet collapse.

There is a specific kind of misery in this: your mind has caught up, but your life has not.

Psychoanalysis does not treat this as a simple failure of awareness. Freud’s name for the phenomenon is repetition, and later, repetition compulsion. The point is direct. When something cannot be fully remembered, spoken, or borne as experience, it returns as something you do. Not as a story about the past, but as a pattern that keeps happening now.

A couple in therapy shows emotional strain while a therapist observes, surrounded by repeated, fading images of internal anguish.

Repetition compulsion, when the past returns as the present

Freud noticed that people often do not merely describe what troubles them. They re-create it. The past returns as a choice, a relationship, a reflex in conflict, a predictable collapse, a way of handling need, shame, anger, desire, or dependence.

That return can be humiliating, especially when you can see it coming. It can also be confusing, because it often looks like you are choosing against yourself.

One way to name what is happening is this: repetition compulsion is the person’s tendency to prefer the familiar, even when the familiar hurts, because the familiar is organized. It has rules. It has a role for you. It offers a known price rather than an unknown risk. It feels like home, even if it is painful.

If that sounds too abstract, bring it down to one question. What is the pattern buying you, and what is it helping you avoid?

Insight can become a form of protection

Many people who repeat patterns are not ignorant. They are perceptive. They can track their history. They can offer a sophisticated explanation. They can even say, with eerie accuracy, what they will do next.

Insight matters, but it does not automatically change how you live.

Sometimes insight becomes a shield. If you can explain your pattern, you can keep it at the level of concept, where it cannot touch you. You can turn experience into narration, and narration into control.

This is one reason therapy can become oddly performative in contemporary culture. People arrive with a well-built theory of themselves. They may even be correct. Yet the pattern remains.

Existential therapy does not oppose insight. It simply asks more of it. If insight does not reach your actual life, then it has not yet become truth in the sense that matters.

Learn more about existential therapy: https://freeassociationclinic.com/existential-therapy/

Working through, the slow conversion of understanding into lived conviction

Freud did not only name repetition. He also named what is required to loosen it.

Working through is not a single realization and not a clever technique. It is the clinical and ethical labor of staying with what resists change, repeatedly, until the repetition becomes speakable and therefore negotiable.

This is where psychoanalytic therapy can feel repetitive. That repetition is not an accident. It is the material. You do not simply talk about the pattern. You encounter it as it appears in the way you relate, including the way you relate to the therapist.

Michael Guy Thompson’s writing places the emphasis where it belongs: on the primacy of lived experience and on the fundamental rule as a pledge toward honesty. Not honesty as confession, and not honesty as self-display, but honesty as the refusal to keep curating your inner life for safety, approval, or control.

Working through begins when the pattern is no longer treated as an object you describe and becomes something you can experience, bear, and respond to differently.

Learn more about psychoanalytic therapy: https://freeassociationclinic.com/psychoanalysis-therapy/

A man and woman face away from each other in a tense therapy scene, with ghostly echoes of the man holding his head in distress.

Freedom and evasion, why repetition can feel like fate

It is tempting to describe repetition as something that merely happens to you. That story is comforting, but it is often incomplete.

Existential thought complicates the picture, and makes it more honest. In a way, we do choose our suffering, often outside awareness. Not because we consciously want pain, but because we participate in an arrangement whose costs we already know. The familiar costs can feel safer than the unfamiliar risks.

This is where Sartre’s point matters. Freedom is not a prize at the end of therapy. Freedom is already the condition. The question is what you do with it, and how you evade it.

A repeating pattern often functions as an alibi. It allows the sentence, “This is just how I am,” or “This is what always happens,” which is less terrifying than admitting, “This is what I keep choosing, and I do not yet want to face the alternatives.”

Working through is the process by which that evasion becomes visible, and therefore less automatic.

What changes when repetition becomes an encounter

Therapy becomes useful when repetition moves from something you regret to something you can meet.

Often the first change is not behavioral. It is clarity about cost. The pattern stops being a story you tell well and becomes something you can feel in its consequences, in intimacy, in aliveness, in time, in honesty.

A second change is how anxiety is understood. Anxiety is often treated as a warning that you are doing something wrong. Existential work treats it more soberly. Sometimes anxiety is what rises when you stop relying on an old arrangement and speak about what’s important.

A third change is that the repetition becomes relational and speakable. Psychoanalytic therapy treats the encounter as central. The relationship is not incidental. It is where the unspoken can emerge, and where old dynamics can be recognized instead of acted out.

This is the lived meaning of working through. Insight becomes real when it is no longer merely said, and begins to change what you can bear, what you can admit, and what you can choose.

A calm, concentric spiral made of smooth stones arranged on a sandy surface, evoking order and contemplation.

Starting at Free Association Clinic

Free Association Clinic offers in-person sessions in San Francisco and telehealth across California.

Request an appointment: https://freeassociationclinic.com/contact-us/

Insurance and practical logistics

The clinic is in-network with Aetna, Blue Shield of California, Blue Cross Blue Shield, Optum / UnitedHealthcare, and Cigna / Evernorth. If your plan is not listed, out-of-network reimbursement may still apply, and the clinic can provide a superbill.

Insurance details: https://freeassociationclinic.com/insurance/

Consultation: Your first session is free if you choose not to continue. If you decide to move forward, payment is discussed during the meeting.

Common questions

If I already understand my pattern, why am I still stuck?
Insight can describe a pattern. Repetition compulsion is the pattern in motion. Working through is how the motion becomes thinkable, speakable, and changeable.

Does it mean therapy is failing if it feels repetitive?
Not necessarily. Repetition is often the doorway. When therapy feels repetitive, it may be contacting the actual material rather than refining the story about it.

What does working through look like in a session?
Often it looks like staying with the moment you usually escape, the moment you convert into explanation, or the moment you try to control. It looks like naming what is happening now, including what is happening between you and the therapist.

How long does it take to stop repeating patterns?
There is no honest universal timeline. Patterns built over years rarely dissolve on command. Psychoanalytic work aims for durable change rather than quick relief.

Safety note

This article is for general education and is not medical or mental health advice. If you or someone you care about is in immediate danger or crisis, call local emergency services or 988 in the United States.


References

Sigmund Freud, Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through (1914)
Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920)
Michael Guy Thompson, The Fundamental Rule of Psychoanalysis (1998)
Michael Guy Thompson, The Enigma of Honesty: The Fundamental Rule of Psychoanalysis (2001)
Michael Guy Thompson, The Ethic of Honesty: The Fundamental Rule of Psychoanalysis (2004)
Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness (1943)

The Crisis of Experience in Contemporary Psychoanalysis: Returning to Lived Experience

The Crisis of Experience in Contemporary Psychoanalysis: Returning to Lived Experience

A Reflection on Michael Guy Thompson’s Essays in Existential Psychoanalysis

Thompson’s Chapter 6 names a problem that tends to hide in plain sight: many contemporary forms of psychoanalysis risk losing the very phenomenon they claim to treat, the patient’s capacity to have experience, to undergo it, to recognize it, and to speak it as one’s own. This is what he calls the crisis of experience in contemporary psychoanalysis: not a shortage of theories about psychic life, but a growing difficulty, culturally and clinically, in remaining answerable to lived experience in therapy itself.

People often come to psychoanalysis because something in their life is no longer coherent, not only because they suffer, but because their suffering has become strangely impersonal. They can describe what is happening with impressive clarity, sometimes even with moving candor, and yet they leave the hour with the faint suspicion that nothing has truly happened. Insight has been produced, but experience has not been reclaimed. Thompson’s wager is that this is not accidental. It is a consequence of how psychoanalytic technique and interpretation can drift, almost imperceptibly, toward commentary about experience, until the patient is asked to live in explanations rather than to re-enter what is being lived.

A therapist and patient sit in a dim, abstract room where experience seems to dissolve into swirling uncertainty.

Experience is not a concept, it is something you undergo

Thompson begins with a philosophical warning that becomes clinical the moment you take it seriously. Adorno suggests that experience is not simply a private event inside the head, but “the union of tradition with an open yearning for what is foreign,” and then adds the more disturbing thought: “the very possibility of experience is in jeopardy” (Adorno, 1992; discussed by Thompson, 2024).

What makes this relevant to the consulting room is that Adorno’s point is not merely that people are distracted, or that culture is superficial, but that experience itself can be thinned out until it becomes difficult to locate where, and in whom, it is happening. Thompson, drawing on Jay, underscores the conceptual difficulty that follows when “experience” becomes an empty password that everyone uses and no one can define without reducing it to something else, as though definition were always already a kind of betrayal (Jay, 1998; Adorno, 1992). In that light, the therapeutic risk comes into view. If experience cannot be defined without shrinking it, then a clinical method that treats experience as raw data to be processed will tend, despite itself, to process the life out of it.

Thompson’s etymological gesture makes the same point from another angle. “Experience” is linked to peril and to trial, to something tested and undergone rather than possessed, which means that experience is never guaranteed by the mere fact that something happened. It can be embraced or resisted, submitted to or evaded, and therefore it always implies risk, a willingness to be changed by what is encountered (Thompson, 2024). If you hold that thought and then listen to patients, you begin to hear why so many symptoms are not only expressions of pain but strategies for avoiding the peril of feeling what one’s life is doing.

Erfahrung and Erlebnis: being experienced and having an experience

Thompson’s Chapter 6 names a problem that tends to hide in plain sight: many contemporary forms of psychoanalysis risk losing the very phenomenon they claim to treat, the patient’s capacity to have experience, to undergo it, to recognize it, and to speak it as one’s own. This is what he calls the crisis of experience in contemporary psychoanalysis: not a shortage of theories about psychic life, but a growing difficulty, culturally and clinically, in remaining answerable to lived experience in therapy itself.

People often come to psychoanalysis because something in their life is no longer coherent, not only because they suffer, but because their suffering has become strangely impersonal. They can describe what is happening with impressive clarity, sometimes even with moving candor, and yet they leave the hour with the faint suspicion that nothing has truly happened. Insight has been produced, but experience has not been reclaimed. Thompson’s wager is that this is not accidental. It is a consequence of how psychoanalytic technique and interpretation can drift, almost imperceptibly, toward commentary about experience, until the patient is asked to live in explanations rather than to re-enter what is being lived.

Why phenomenology matters for psychoanalysis

Thompson’s argument is ultimately a defense of phenomenological psychoanalysis, not as an academic specialization, but as a necessary correction to a drift in psychoanalytic practice. He is explicit that what he has been describing “sounds a lot more like phenomenology than psychoanalysis,” and his response is telling: psychoanalysis is phenomenological, at least in the way Freud conceived it, insofar as it attends to experience as it is lived and spoken, rather than treating the patient as a specimen whose inner life must be inferred from a theoretical grid (Thompson, 2024).

The tension, of course, is that Freud’s unconscious can be read in a way that becomes nonphenomenological, as though something were happening “in” the mind that the person can never experience, as though the unconscious were a parallel theatre whose drama the patient does not witness. Yet Thompson insists that awareness and experience are interdependent phenomena, and that even when a person is “unaware,” what is at stake is often not the existence of a second life but a failure of listening, a failure of being present to one’s own thinking as it occurs (Thompson, 2024).

Here Thompson introduces an important reframing of “unconscious experience.” From a phenomenological angle, the unconscious can be understood less as a hidden content that the analyst discovers and more as a mode of consciousness the patient is not experiencing as consciousness, because the patient did not “hear” themselves thinking it when it occurred. The analytic task becomes reacquainting the patient with that dimension of Being that is typically concealed, so that experience becomes claimable precisely through speech, through free association, through hearing oneself for the first time (Thompson, 2024).
This is where the crisis begins to sharpen. If psychoanalysis forgets that its object is experience as lived and suffered, then it will inevitably become tempted by a different object: correctness, explanation, interpretive authority, and technical mastery.

Interpretation that deepens experience, not explanation that replaces it

In Thompson’s framing, the point is not to abolish interpretation, but to return interpretation to its phenomenological vocation. If speech can deepen experience, then interpretation should participate in that deepening, not by supplying the patient with a superior explanation of what is “really” going on, but by drawing the patient back toward what is being lived and avoided in the act of speaking. When interpretation becomes primarily explanatory, it can function as a defense, not only the patient’s defense but the analyst’s defense against the anxiety of not knowing, against the discomfort of remaining with what is ambiguous, conflicted, or still in the process of taking shape.

This is also where Thompson’s language about degrees of experience matters. Experience is not all-or-nothing; there are levels, and those levels depend on whether we are prepared to undergo the suffering involved in determining what our experience is (Thompson, 2024). In the clinic, this means that the most decisive moments are often not those in which an interpretation is accepted, but those in which a patient, sometimes with surprise, realizes that they have begun to feel what they have been saying, and that feeling is now theirs, not simply a theory about themselves.

The crisis of experience in contemporary psychoanalysis: when technique outruns lived reality

Thompson’s critique is sharp because it is internal. He argues that not everyone approaches Freud’s conception of the unconscious phenomenologically, and that, as a result, psychoanalysis has “unwittingly contributed” to the broader cultural crisis of experience that has been unfolding since the close of the last century (Thompson, 2024). What is striking is his insistence that even earnest efforts to incorporate phenomenology into psychoanalytic theory have largely “fallen short” of reframing practice along phenomenological lines, which would require a more sustained emphasis on what experience itself entails as a psychodynamic event (Thompson, 2024).

His conclusion is uncompromising: the mainstream of psychoanalysis has, in effect, factored the phenomenological notion of experience out of existence, and even the turn to intersubjectivity in psychoanalysis often retains an empiricist account of experience rather than a phenomenological one (Thompson, 2024).

For patients, this is not an abstract dispute. It names a recognizable disappointment: the feeling of being spoken about, explained, even brilliantly interpreted, while one’s own experience remains strangely out of reach, as though the self were something the therapist can see more clearly than the person living it. For clinicians, it names a temptation that arrives precisely when a treatment becomes difficult, when the analyst begins to prefer the security of the conceptual apparatus over the vulnerability of staying with what is happening.

A solitary figure sits in a quiet room facing a hazy horizon, evoking reflection and ambiguity.

“Unconscious experience” and the problem of parallel lives

To make the crisis concrete, Thompson turns to Kleinian theory and to Susan Isaacs’ explication of “unconscious experience,” which he treats as a revealing contradiction: if something is unconscious in the strict sense, then in what sense can it be called experience at all (Thompson, 2024)? He follows Laing’s critique in Self and Others, where Isaacs is presented as implying that each person lives two parallel lives, one conscious and one unconscious, and that the unconscious life is never available to awareness (Thompson, 2024; Laing, 1969/1961).

If that is your theory of the psyche, then the technical consequences are almost unavoidable. You must infer what is going on “in” the unconscious, because the patient cannot experience it, cannot confirm it, cannot claim it. Isaacs, as Thompson presents her, insists that the unconscious has aims and motives that cannot become conscious and therefore cannot be experienced in the sense under discussion, which means that unconscious fantasy is treated as determining what can be consciously experienced (Thompson, 2024).

Laing’s protest, which is as ethical as it is conceptual, is that things become impossible when someone tells you that you are experiencing something you are not experiencing. As he puts it, “Things are going to be difficult if you tell me that I am experiencing something I am not experiencing” (Laing, 1969/1961; quoted by Thompson, 2024). The point is not that unconscious life is unreal, but that “unconscious experience” becomes a formulation that licenses a particular kind of interpretive sovereignty, in which the patient’s lived experience is treated as a disguise and the analyst’s inference is treated as reality.

Countertransference and projective identification: when the analyst becomes the arbiter

This is where Thompson’s critique of technique becomes especially pointed, because it touches the contemporary fascination with countertransference and projective identification. He argues that the Kleinian conception of projective identification has displaced repression as the prototypical defense, and in doing so has “virtually inverted” conventional notions of transference and countertransference, altering them so radically that they become “virtually unrecognizable” (Thompson, 2024).

The decisive shift is epistemic. Following this line, Bion concludes that the only means available to determine the patient’s unconscious experience is through the analyst’s experience of countertransference, a position that effectively relocates the evidence for the patient’s experience into the analyst’s experience (Bion, 1959; discussed by Thompson, 2024). Thompson quotes Bion describing how the analyst feels manipulated, as though made to play a part in someone else’s fantasy, and he presents this as a crystallization of the problem: psychoanalytic knowledge becomes increasingly grounded in what the analyst feels, rather than in what the patient can come to experience and claim.

None of this requires dismissing countertransference, nor denying that projective processes occur. The question is what kind of authority is created when the analyst’s felt experience becomes the privileged route to the patient’s truth, and what happens to the patient’s subjectivity when their own account is treated as secondary, suspect, or structurally incapable of reaching what is most real. The crisis of experience shows itself precisely here, where intersubjectivity in psychoanalysis can turn into a quiet conquest: the analyst becomes the one who experiences the patient’s life more fully than the patient does. Thompson’s insistence on phenomenology is, in this sense, a defense of the patient’s right to be the subject of their own experience, even when that experience is conflicted, defended against, or only barely speakable.

Two figures sit closely as their shared thoughts rise into a glowing form, symbolizing the intimacy and complexity of lived experience.

Returning therapy to experience: what changes in the consulting room

Thompson’s most concise description of psychoanalysis’ purpose deserves to be read slowly. The aim is “to return the analytic patient to the ground of an experience,” so that the patient can finally claim the experience as their own in the act of recounting it (Thompson, 2024). Once you take this seriously, the consulting room changes, not because technique disappears, but because technique is subordinated to the patient’s capacity to undergo, recognize, and speak what is happening, rather than to merely receive interpretations about what is supposedly happening.

In practice, this return to lived experience in therapy often looks deceptively simple, because it is less about dramatic interventions and more about a discipline of attention. The analyst stays close to the texture of what the patient is actually living in language, noticing where speech becomes a way of not feeling, where explanation substitutes for contact, and where a word is spoken with the body absent from it. Interpretation, when it arrives, is offered less as a verdict and more as a way of pressing experience downward, toward what Thompson calls the gravity of circumstances, toward the place where a patient cannot merely agree but must either encounter or resist what is being said.

For patients, the difference is often felt as a change in atmosphere: one is not treated as an object to be decoded, but as a subject being asked to re-enter one’s own life. For therapists, the difference is felt as a constraint on one’s own ambition to know too quickly, to be right, to do something impressive, because the analyst’s task becomes protecting the possibility that the patient might finally hear themselves, and be changed by what they hear.

If you are looking for this orientation in clinical work, Free Association Clinic offers psychoanalytic therapy and existential therapy grounded in these phenomenological questions, where interpretation is kept in the service of experience rather than allowed to eclipse it.

What this chapter asks of clinicians in training

Thompson’s chapter does not flatter the clinician, and that is part of its value. The crisis of experience is not only a theoretical failure, it is also a temptation that lives inside training and practice, because uncertainty is hard to tolerate and theory offers a ready-made refuge. When the analyst begins to rely on speculative certainty, especially certainty grounded in their own countertransference as proof of what the patient “really” experiences, the analytic relationship risks becoming a place where experience is taken away from the patient under the guise of explaining it.

For clinicians in formation, this is not a call to abandon psychoanalytic knowledge, but to remember what psychoanalytic knowledge is for. It is for returning the patient to experience, and therefore it demands a kind of humility that cannot be simulated: a willingness to remain with not-knowing; to let the patient’s speech unfold without rushing to translate it; to hold one’s own experience as meaningful but not sovereign; and to keep asking, in every interpretive movement, whether the patient is being returned to the ground of their experience or being displaced from it by a more elegant account.

FAC’s training program in existential psychoanalysis is oriented around exactly these questions, because the point is not to produce technicians of interpretation, but clinicians capable of phenomenological listening, clinicians who can bear the anxiety of experience without replacing it with theory.


Conclusion

The crisis of experience in contemporary psychoanalysis is not primarily a complaint that psychoanalysis has become too intellectual, nor a nostalgic wish for a more “human” therapy. It is a more exacting claim: that psychoanalysis risks reproducing, in the consulting room, the same impoverishment of experience that contemporary culture already encourages, replacing the dangerous vitality of lived experience with commentary, explanation, and interpretive mastery. Thompson’s insistence on phenomenology is therefore not a philosophical ornament, it is a clinical ethic. It asks whether psychoanalysis will remain faithful to the patient’s experience, including what is painful, resistant, and difficult to undergo, or whether it will trade that fidelity for a more comforting kind of knowledge.

If you want to explore therapy where lived experience in therapy is treated as primary, not as an afterthought, you can contact Free Association Clinic.


James Norwood, PsyD
Associate Director, New School for Existential Psychoanalysis (https://www.freeassociation.us)
Clinical Director, The Free Association Clinic for Existential Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis (https://www.freeassociationclinic.com)
Founder/CEO, inpersontherapy.com (https://inpersontherapy.com)

References

Thompson, M. G. (2024). Essays in Existential Psychoanalysis: On the Primacy of Authenticity. Routledge.
Adorno, T. W. (1992). Notes to Literature, Volume 1 (S. Weber Nicholsen, Trans.). Columbia University Press.
Jay, M. (1998, November 14). The Crisis of Experience in a Post-Subjective Age (public lecture). University of California, Berkeley.
Laing, R. D. (1969/1961). Self and Others. Pantheon.
Bion, W. R. (1959). “Attacks on Linking.” International Journal of Psycho-Analysis.

Will and Desire in Existential Psychoanalysis: Rethinking Willpower in Therapy

Will and Desire in Existential Psychoanalysis: Rethinking Willpower in Therapy

A Reflection on Michael Guy Thompson’s Essays in Existential Psychoanalysis

Most of us have tried to change something about ourselves through sheer effort. We make a plan, set a rule, tighten our grip, and then watch ourselves do the very thing we swore we would not do.

It is easy to call this “a lack of willpower.” It is also easy to feel ashamed when willpower does not deliver.

In Chapter 4 of Michael Guy Thompson’s Essays in Existential Psychoanalysis, the question becomes more interesting, and more clinically useful. When we look closely at will and desire in existential psychoanalysis, “the will” is not simply the engine of change. Often it is the strategy we use to keep desire contained, especially when desire feels risky

The familiar proverb, and the hidden question behind it

“Where there is a will there is a way” sounds comforting. It suggests that a strong enough inner force can override fear, conflict, and ambivalence.

Thompson opens the chapter by quietly challenging that assumption. The proverb is not exactly wrong, but it hides a deeper question: what do we mean when we say “will” in the first place?

Because in actual human life, will is rarely just a clean, rational lever. It carries mood, morality, and history. It can sound like duty. It can sound like threat. It can also sound like a parent’s voice that we have learned to speak to ourselves with.

For people seeking therapy, this matters. Many forms of suffering come with an exhausting internal dialogue: I should be different. I need to be better. I have to get control.

Will as virtue, will as “free choice,” and why this history still matters

Part of Thompson’s point is that our modern idea of will did not appear out of nowhere. The “will” has a long philosophical lineage, and it often arrives dressed in moral language.

In very broad strokes, classical ethics tends to link the will to character formation and self-mastery. Religious philosophy tends to link the will to responsibility, temptation, and virtue. Even if we have never read Aristotle or Augustine, many of us have inherited a worldview where willpower is treated as proof of goodness, and failure of will is treated as a personal flaw.

In therapy, those inherited meanings show up as guilt and self-judgment. People do not simply want to change. They often feel they must change in order to deserve care, belonging, or respect.

Existential psychoanalysis does not dismiss responsibility. But it is suspicious of the way “responsibility” becomes a weapon turned inward.

will and desire in existential psychoanalysis, choice and risk

Schopenhauer, and the will we cannot simply command

Thompson turns to Schopenhauer for a remark that lands with a kind of cold clarity: “You can do as you will, but you cannot will as you will.”

It is a short sentence, but it reorganizes the problem. We may be able to force certain behaviors, at least for a while. But we cannot simply choose what we want, or stop wanting what we want, by issuing ourselves a command.

Schopenhauer’s view pushes the will down below the level of conscious intention. The will becomes something more like an underlying drive, closer to desire than to “decision.” If that is true, then “willpower” is not the same as the will. It is more like an executive function, a manager that tries to direct what is already moving.

Clinically, this is one reason a person can “know better” and still repeat the pattern. The knowledge is real. The intention is real. But desire is also real, and it often carries more force than our conscious plans.

Nietzsche and the hunger for a fuller life

Thompson also brings in Nietzsche, especially the riddle of “will to power.” In pop culture, this phrase can sound like domination. But Nietzsche’s point is often closer to vitality than tyranny.

If Schopenhauer emphasizes the way desire operates beneath the self’s proud claims, Nietzsche emphasizes the way desire moves toward intensity, toward aliveness, toward a more fully lived existence.

In therapy, this can be a helpful reframe. Sometimes the “problem behavior” is not merely a failure of control. Sometimes it is a distorted attempt to recover feeling, to break through numbness, to escape the flatness of life lived only through duty.

That does not make every desire wise. But it does remind us that desire is often the place where the person is trying to live.

Why “trying harder” can work, and why it often does not

Modern psychotherapy has many approaches that treat change as a function of volition. In the best versions, this is not simplistic. It can be deeply compassionate. It helps people identify patterns, practice skills, and build stability.

It can also work, especially when someone needs structure, containment, or immediate relief.

Thompson’s critique is not that volition is useless. It is that volition becomes misleading when it is treated as the core of psychic change. A willpower model tends to imagine the self as a commander standing above desire.

Existential psychoanalysis leans in a different direction. It asks: what if the “commander” is itself part of the conflict? What if the manager is not neutral, but frightened? What if “control” is sometimes the price we pay to avoid risk?

This is one reason desire and change are so closely linked. Desire almost always implies exposure. It implies the possibility of disappointment. It implies that we cannot fully guarantee the outcome.

willpower vs desire in therapy, finding direction

Laing, Sartre, and the problem of changing because you “should”

Thompson draws on R.D. Laing to make a sharp clinical observation: people often attempt change because they “should,” or because they “need to,” but change becomes durable when they genuinely want it.

Laing’s view, as Thompson presents it, is that our selfhood is located in desire rather than in ego or character traits. In that frame, the will has a limited role, it can synthesize, and it can repress.

This matters in the clinic because “the will” is frequently recruited as a defense.

A clear example in the chapter is addiction, but the point extends beyond substances. Many people try to force themselves out of a pattern using an internal voice of obligation, a kind of “introjected parent” that demands compliance. The person fights their desire while also protecting it. They go back and forth, and the struggle becomes a way of life.

Thompson’s deeper point is not moral judgment. It is existential. When we are terrified of the pain that desire brings, we will do almost anything to silence it.

When the will suppresses the pain of desire

Near the end of the chapter, Thompson offers a line that is easy to recognize if you have ever been stuck in a high-functioning version of suffering.

Sometimes the will is what remains when desire has gone quiet. A person can keep going, keep performing, keep achieving, all while feeling that something essential has been buried.

In that condition, willpower can look impressive from the outside. It can lead to success. It can also produce a life that feels strangely empty.

Thompson notes another uncomfortable truth: you do not always need a substance to reduce anxiety. The will can do it. You can tighten down, numb out, and survive. The cost is that desire, which often requires risk, gets treated as dangerous.

When will and desire are at cross purposes, will often wins, at least in the short run. But the victory is rarely satisfying.

And there is a further twist: the will frequently resists change. If the will has become the tool we use to stay safe, it is not eager to surrender its job.

existential psychoanalysis and the role of desire in change


Conclusion

One of Thompson’s most clinically useful suggestions in Chapter 4 is that meaningful change often arrives indirectly. Genuine change comes when we want to change, not because we should, and not because we are trying to force ourselves into compliance.

The function of therapy, in this view, is not to shout louder instructions at the self. It is to use reflection, a form of will, to examine why we repeatedly obstruct our own desire, and to put those defenses into question. We cannot simply will ourselves to drop our defenses, but sustained inquiry can loosen what once seemed rigid.

If you find yourself stuck between duty and desire, or caught in cycles of self-control followed by collapse, this is the kind of work we explore in depth at Free Association Clinic through both psychoanalytic therapy and existential therapy. Clinicians in training who want to engage these questions clinically can also learn more about our training program. To begin a conversation, you can contact Free Association Clinic.


James Norwood, PsyD
Associate Director, New School for Existential Psychoanalysis (https://www.freeassociation.us)
Clinical Director, The Free Association Clinic for Existential Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis (https://www.freeassociationclinic.com)
Founder/CEO, inpersontherapy.com (https://inpersontherapy.com)
Aristotle. (1915). The Works of Aristotle, Vol. IX: Ethica Nicomachea (W. D. Ross, Trans.). Oxford University Press.
Augustine. (2010). Augustine: On the Free Choice of the Will, On Grace and Free Choice, and Other Writings (Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy). Cambridge University Press.
Laing, R. D. (1979). Personal communication.
Nietzsche, F. (2001). Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future (J. Norman, Trans.). Cambridge University Press.
Schopenhauer, A. (2012). The World as Will and Representation (E. F. J. Payne, Trans.). Dover Publications.
Thompson, M. G. (1994). The Truth About Freud’s Technique: The Encounter With the Real. New York University Press.
Thompson, M. G. (2020). Existential psychoanalysis: The role of freedom in the clinical encounter. In A. Govrin & J. Mills (Eds.), Innovations in Psychoanalysis: Originality, Development, Progress. Routledge.
Thompson, M. G. (2024). Essays in Existential Psychoanalysis: On the Primacy of Authenticity. Routledge.

Will vs Desire in Psychoanalysis: Why Willpower Is Not the Whole Story

Will vs Desire in Psychoanalysis: Why Willpower Is Not the Whole Story

A reflection on Michael Guy Thompson’s “What Is the Will? On the Role of Desire in Psychoanalysis” (Chapter 4 of Essays in Existential Psychoanalysis)

Most people who arrive in psychotherapy do not need to be told what the “right” decision is, at least not in the thin, everyday sense of rightness, because they have usually rehearsed it for months or years, sometimes with impressive discipline and a kind of grim fidelity to self-critique, and what brings them in is the humiliating discovery that knowing what one should do is not the same thing as being able to do it.

That discovery is often moralized too quickly. When effort fails, the default explanation is characterological: not enough willpower, not enough motivation, not enough discipline. Yet the consulting room, if it is honest, keeps exposing a different structure of the problem, one in which “willpower in therapy” names less a solution than a confusion about what kind of creature a person is, and what actually moves, or obstructs, the movement of a life.

In Chapter 4 of Essays in Existential Psychoanalysis, Michael Guy Thompson asks the question with a deceptively ordinary bluntness: what is the will, and what is its relation to desire? What follows is not a technical footnote, because once the will is treated as mysterious rather than obvious, the whole modern moral economy of “just try harder” starts to look like a defense against something more disturbing, namely that desire and the unconscious do not politely wait for conscious plans, and that our experience of agency is more fragile, and more complicated, than the willpower story suggests.

Willpower in therapy and the experience of being stuck

The will is often imagined as an inner executive, a rational manager who surveys options, selects a course of action, and then commands the self to comply, as if the person were a well-designed machine that occasionally needs firmer leadership. Thompson sketches this familiar definition precisely in order to show how seductive it is, and how quickly it collapses when we take lived experience seriously, because it assumes that will is not only conscious but also controllable, always “at our disposal,” as though the mind were a hand that could simply grip more tightly when life becomes difficult.

Therapy, however, is full of phenomena that make that model feel naïve, not because patients are irrational, but because they are human. People decide and do not follow through. They achieve what they once wanted and find the achievement strangely empty. They sabotage a relationship they claim to value, not as a theatrical act of self-destruction, but with the eerie feeling of watching oneself do it anyway. They speak as if two voices were competing in the same body, one insisting on what is proper and one pulling toward what is forbidden, or feared, or simply alive.

If we stay at the level of discipline, we reduce this division to a defect. If we stay at the level of existential psychoanalysis and agency, we begin to hear it differently, as a conflict about desire and about what desire would require, and as a conflict that is not solved by pressure but by understanding, because pressure is so often the very instrument by which the self tries to suppress what it cannot admit it wants.

Will vs desire in psychoanalysis, the question beneath “try harder”

Thompson’s decisive reversal is stated in a line that deserves to be read slowly, precisely because it attacks a cherished modern fantasy, that we are autonomous choosers who can simply select our wants the way we select our clothes: “My desires choose me. I do not choose my desires.”

This is the pivot of will vs desire in psychoanalysis, and it is also the point where the moralism of “motivation vs discipline” becomes inadequate, because the question is no longer how to force compliance with a decision but how to understand what, in fact, has already been decided at another level, one that is not fully reflective, and that does not announce itself as a decision at all. Thompson even treats will itself as potentially non-conscious, which is to say that the very faculty we enlist to control desire may already be entangled with it, recruited by it, or turned against it.

When “trying harder” fails, the more existential question is not whether you lack strength, but what you are actually protecting yourself from by clinging to the language of strength. The willpower story offers a simple moral drama: I should, therefore I must. Desire interrupts that drama with a different disclosure: I do not, and the reason matters. The unconscious, in this sense, is not a basement full of irrational impulses, but the place where our real commitments, fears, and longings are already operative before we can dignify them with conscious reasons.

will vs desire in psychoanalysis, choice and agency

Two traditions of the will, and the moral burden we still carry

Thompson traces two opposed conceptions of will that still haunt contemporary therapy culture, even when their philosophical origins are forgotten. One tradition ties will to virtue, and therefore to self-mastery and goodness, while the other tradition treats will as synonymous with desire, and therefore as largely unconscious.

In the virtue tradition, Aristotle becomes a key point of reference, because the will is imagined as something that can be cultivated through wisdom and self-mastery, and the person who “chooses rightly” is not merely effective but admirable. Thompson’s point is not to dismiss this tradition, since its moral seriousness still animates many people’s sense of what a life ought to be, but to show how easily it becomes punitive when imported into psychotherapy as an expectation that one should be able to master oneself simply by deciding to.

Augustine intensifies the moral weight even further by naming will “the mother and guardian of virtue,” which quietly installs the idea that failure of will is not merely failure of action but failure of goodness, a shift that helps explain why willpower discourse so quickly turns into shame.

What follows in modernity is a further confusion, because the debate about “free will” often assumes that freedom means control, as if being free were identical with being able to override whatever one feels in the name of reason, and as if the presence of anxiety, grief, craving, ambivalence, or fear were simply obstacles to be conquered rather than experiences to be understood. Thompson notes how early modern thinkers questioned the very distinction between “will” and “free will,” and how the discussion opens directly into the problem of consciousness, of what it means to call something free, and of how ethics is entangled with that freedom.

Clinically, the cost of this confusion is predictable. If freedom is mistaken for control, then every failure to control oneself becomes proof that one is not free, and the person oscillates between omnipotent fantasy and helpless despair, between “I should be able to” and “I cannot,” without ever arriving at the more difficult possibility, that freedom may not look like mastery, and that responsibility may not look like self-condemnation.

Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, when desire chooses us

Thompson locates a decisive rupture in the nineteenth century, when Schopenhauer situates will in the unconscious and explicitly equates it with desire, a move that makes the old executive model feel suddenly untenable.

Schopenhauer’s free-will quote is famous for a reason, because it offers a hard clarity that most people recognize immediately in their own lives, even if they dislike its implications: “You can do as you will, but you cannot will as you will.”

Thompson emphasizes the clinical sting: if desire is primary, then knowledge is often recruited after the fact, in the service of what is already wanted, and the demand to “choose better wants” becomes not only unrealistic but cruel, because it frames unconscious life as a moral defect rather than a human condition. Schopenhauer, on Thompson’s reading, abandons the fantasy that will is an executive function and places it in “a maelstrom of feelings, desires, and inclinations,” which is another way of saying that willpower is not a separate instrument we can simply pick up, but part of the very life we are trying to control.

Nietzsche receives Schopenhauer’s disruption without adopting his pessimism, and Thompson’s interpretation is worth lingering on because it reframes the usual popular caricature of Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s “Will to Power,” Thompson suggests, can be read less as domination than as “Desire to Passion,” a striving toward a life that is not merely compliant but intense, engaged, and willing to risk itself in living.

Whether one agrees with every nuance of that gloss, the clinical point is sharp: the opposite of health is not simply weak will, but deadened desire, a life organized around safety, approval, and self-suppression. In that condition, the will can still function, sometimes brilliantly, producing careers, achievements, and outward success, and yet the person suffers a quieter collapse of vitality, the feeling that one is living someone else’s life, or living one’s own life as if it belonged to a stranger.

Freud’s ego and id, the rider and the horse

Thompson’s chapter becomes especially clinically legible when it moves into Freud, because Freud offers a vocabulary that many therapists already carry, even if they no longer use it explicitly, and that vocabulary is still useful for thinking about how “will” can become both ally and adversary. Thompson summarizes Freud’s position in a way that also satisfies the familiar SEO phrase, the Freud ego and id rider-and-horse metaphor: Freud situates will in the ego, while desire is lodged in libido, or the id, and the relation between them is “analogous to a rider on a horse,” where the horse “knows where it wants to go” and the rider tries, with mixed success, to guide it.

The important word here is not guidance but compromise. Freud, in Thompson’s rendering, is neither a moralist of reason nor a celebrant of impulse; he is a realist about conflict. The “happy person” is not the one who conquers desire, but the one who has “come to terms with his desires” and therefore does not waste life fighting an internal civil war, while the neurotic “doesn’t trust his desires” and suppresses them “out of fear.”

From this angle, symptoms do not arise because desire exists but because desire is treated as dangerous, shameful, or intolerable, which is why the will, when enlisted as a weapon against desire, so often becomes an agent of repression rather than an agent of freedom. The will can either serve desire, by not getting in its way, or it can become the instrument by which a person tries to extinguish what is most personal, and then wonders why life feels impersonal.

Freud rider and horse metaphor, ego and desire in therapy

Why change is indirect, Sartre, Laing, and the limits of willpower

The question that naturally follows is one that matters equally to patients and to clinicians: if will is not sovereign, and if desire cannot simply be commanded, how does change happen at all, and what exactly is therapy doing when it is not simply coaching better discipline.
Thompson’s answer proceeds through the existential tradition. He invokes Sartre in a way that brings the ethical stakes into view, since Sartre suggests that neurosis can be understood as a kind of fundamental choice, made at an unconscious and pre-reflective level, which means that our suffering is not only a consequence of what happened to us but also a meaningful way we have taken up what happened, and therefore something for which we remain implicated.

This is the point where Sartre’s freedom and responsibility in therapy become psychologically relevant, because responsibility is not reduced to self-blame, and freedom is not reduced to control, but both become ways of naming that a person is not merely the passive object of forces, whether those forces are called trauma, drives, or pathology.
Yet Thompson is equally clear about the limit: “If I cannot will myself to health, then how does change come about?” He reports that when he asked R.D. Laing this question in supervision, Laing answered with one word, “indirectly.”

That single word, and the way Thompson elaborates it, cuts through the false alternative between helplessness and voluntarism. He writes that one cannot will oneself to overcome the fear of intimacy, to love more generously, to behave more compassionately, or to feel more alive, and yet these dilemmas often improve as a consequence of the endeavor to know oneself, even if the mechanism of that change remains mysterious.

This is also where Thompson’s critique of certain modern therapies becomes precise rather than polemical. He notes that behavioral psychology, and later CBT, often equate will with volition, assume that choices are driven by rationality rather than desire, and treat willpower as the capacity to commit to a course of action by correcting irrational thought.

Thompson does not deny that people sometimes improve, but he offers a deeper explanation for why improvement happens when it does: according to Laing, what probably helps CBT patients change is not willpower at all but desire, and specifically the desire that emerges through the relationship with the therapist, “not willfully but indirectly,” which is to say unconsciously.

If we take that seriously, the contemporary contrast between motivation vs discipline looks like a displacement. Discipline can sometimes produce behavior, but therapy is concerned with the conditions under which a person can want, and can tolerate wanting, and can bear the risk that wanting entails. That is not a slogan, and it is not a technique in the narrow sense. It is an encounter with freedom that does not flatter us with fantasies of control.

“I should” versus “I want,” where shame disguises fear

One of the more clinically illuminating sections of Thompson’s chapter turns on a simple linguistic difference that both patients and therapists know, even when they do not name it: the difference between “I should” and “I want.” The “should” voice has moral force, and it often has the tone of an internalized authority, while “want” risks sincerity, which is precisely why it often feels more dangerous.
Thompson illustrates this through addiction, not in the flattened, behavioral sense of a bad habit, but as a conflict about desire itself. The addict may feel he should stop because his life is being destroyed, yet “unless he genuinely wants to, he will fail,” because the will is an executive function that can serve desire or oppose it, and when it is in opposition the person becomes divided against himself.

Here Thompson’s language is intentionally provocative, and it is clinically accurate enough to be unsettling: the addict tells himself he must get “in control,” as if a force of will could steel him against desire, but this refusal to genuinely want is sustained by an “introjected mommy” that tries to make him do what he does not actually want to do, and Laing, as Thompson reports him, believes this never works.

The deeper point is not confined to substances, because the structure appears wherever the will is mobilized to suppress the pain of desire, which is also to say the pain of living, the pain of risk, and the pain of possible failure. Thompson writes that at bottom the addict wants to be free of the pain elicited by desire, and therefore medicates the pain, yet “you can never kill your desire, you can only redirect it,” because desire entails risk and the possibility of disappointment, which the addicted person cannot tolerate.

In this light, what looks like weak will is often a more complex drama, where will is recruited as a defense against desire, or where will becomes the instrument of fear. One can live in that arrangement for a long time, even successfully by external standards, and Thompson makes the point with a bleak irony: you do not even need drugs to reduce anxiety, because “your will can do it for you,” and will and desire are often at cross purposes regarding how much risk we allow ourselves.

This is a difficult claim to hear, especially for conscientious people, because it suggests that the will is not automatically the ally of growth, and may in fact “resist change,” which is why moral exhortation so often produces the opposite of what it intends, namely a tightening of defenses and a deepening of shame.

Thompson’s own clinical implication is precise and, in its way, austere. Genuine change comes about when we want to change, not because we need to or should, and therapy’s function is not to coerce desire into propriety but to use our capacity for reflection, which he identifies here with will, to assess why we get in the way of our desires and to put defenses into question. We cannot will ourselves to let go of defenses, but inquiry can lead to change even when we have no control over the matter.

For clinicians, this reframes technique as something less like intervention upon a patient and more like participation in a process of clarification, where the patient’s ambivalence is not treated as noncompliance but as meaningful conflict, and where the therapist’s task is not to win an argument with resistance but to help make the patient’s resistance intelligible, which is a different kind of respect. For patients, the same reframing can be experienced as a release from the moral theater of discipline, because it suggests that the problem is not that one is defective, but that one’s desire is conflicted, feared, or hidden, and that truthfulness about that conflict is already a movement toward freedom.

“I should” versus “I want,” where shame disguises fear

One of the more clinically illuminating sections of Thompson’s chapter turns on a simple linguistic difference that both patients and therapists know, even when they do not name it: the difference between “I should” and “I want.” The “should” voice has moral force, and it often has the tone of an internalized authority, while “want” risks sincerity, which is precisely why it often feels more dangerous.
Thompson illustrates this through addiction, not in the flattened, behavioral sense of a bad habit, but as a conflict about desire itself. The addict may feel he should stop because his life is being destroyed, yet “unless he genuinely wants to, he will fail,” because the will is an executive function that can serve desire or oppose it, and when it is in opposition the person becomes divided against himself.

Here Thompson’s language is intentionally provocative, and it is clinically accurate enough to be unsettling: the addict tells himself he must get “in control,” as if a force of will could steel him against desire, but this refusal to genuinely want is sustained by an “introjected mommy” that tries to make him do what he does not actually want to do, and Laing, as Thompson reports him, believes this never works.

The deeper point is not confined to substances, because the structure appears wherever the will is mobilized to suppress the pain of desire, which is also to say the pain of living, the pain of risk, and the pain of possible failure. Thompson writes that at bottom the addict wants to be free of the pain elicited by desire, and therefore medicates the pain, yet “you can never kill your desire, you can only redirect it,” because desire entails risk and the possibility of disappointment, which the addicted person cannot tolerate.

In this light, what looks like weak will is often a more complex drama, where will is recruited as a defense against desire, or where will becomes the instrument of fear. One can live in that arrangement for a long time, even successfully by external standards, and Thompson makes the point with a bleak irony: you do not even need drugs to reduce anxiety, because “your will can do it for you,” and will and desire are often at cross purposes regarding how much risk we allow ourselves.

This is a difficult claim to hear, especially for conscientious people, because it suggests that the will is not automatically the ally of growth, and may in fact “resist change,” which is why moral exhortation so often produces the opposite of what it intends, namely a tightening of defenses and a deepening of shame.

Thompson’s own clinical implication is precise and, in its way, austere. Genuine change comes about when we want to change, not because we need to or should, and therapy’s function is not to coerce desire into propriety but to use our capacity for reflection, which he identifies here with will, to assess why we get in the way of our desires and to put defenses into question. We cannot will ourselves to let go of defenses, but inquiry can lead to change even when we have no control over the matter.

For clinicians, this reframes technique as something less like intervention upon a patient and more like participation in a process of clarification, where the patient’s ambivalence is not treated as noncompliance but as meaningful conflict, and where the therapist’s task is not to win an argument with resistance but to help make the patient’s resistance intelligible, which is a different kind of respect. For patients, the same reframing can be experienced as a release from the moral theater of discipline, because it suggests that the problem is not that one is defective, but that one’s desire is conflicted, feared, or hidden, and that truthfulness about that conflict is already a movement toward freedom.

desire and willpower in existential psychoanalysis


Conclusion

The ordinary language of willpower promises dignity through control, and when control fails it offers shame as an explanation, as if shame were the missing fuel that will finally make a person comply with what they already know they “should” do. Thompson’s chapter quietly dismantles that arrangement by refusing to treat the will as a simple command center, and by insisting that will vs desire in psychoanalysis is, at bottom, a question about what we are, about how desire and the unconscious constitute our agency, and about how fear turns the will into a defensive instrument.

If desire chooses us, and if the will is not always conscious or controllable, then therapy cannot be reduced to motivation, discipline, or self-management. It becomes, instead, an indirect process in Laing’s sense, grounded in the slow work of reflection and the capacity to question defenses without pretending we can simply abolish them by command, and oriented toward the more existential aim of becoming less divided against oneself.

Free Association Clinic offers psychoanalytic therapy and existential therapy. If you would like to begin a conversation, you can contact Free Association Clinic.


James Norwood, PsyD
Associate Director, New School for Existential Psychoanalysis (https://www.freeassociation.us)
Clinical Director, The Free Association Clinic for Existential Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis (https://www.freeassociationclinic.com)
Founder/CEO, inpersontherapy.com (https://inpersontherapy.com)


Sources

Aristotle. (1915). The Works of Aristotle, Vol. IX: Ethica Nicomachea (W. D. Ross, Trans.). Oxford University Press.
Augustine. (2010). Augustine: On the Free Choice of the Will, On Grace and Free Choice, and Other Writings (Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy). Cambridge University Press.
Laing, R. D. (1979). Personal communication.
Nietzsche, F. (2001). Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future (J. Norman, Trans.). Cambridge University Press.
Schopenhauer, A. (2012). The World as Will and Representation (E. F. J. Payne, Trans.). Dover Publications.
Thompson, M. G. (1994). The Truth About Freud’s Technique: The Encounter with the Real. New York University Press.
Thompson, M. G. (2020). Existential psychoanalysis: The role of freedom in the clinical encounter. In A. Govrin & J. Mills (Eds.), Innovations in Psychoanalysis: Originality, Development, Progress. Routledge.
Thompson, M. G. (2024). Essays in Existential Psychoanalysis: On the Primacy of Authenticity. Routledge.

Freedom and Responsibility in Existential Psychoanalysis: Sartre’s Influence on Clinical Practice

Freedom and Responsibility in Existential Psychoanalysis:
Sartre’s Influence on Clinical Practice

A Reflection on Michael Guy Thompson’s
Essays in Existential Psychoanalysis

The relationship between psychoanalysis and existentialism has long been marked by tension. Psychoanalysis, particularly in its Freudian form, delves into the unconscious, focusing on hidden drives and repressed desires that shape behavior. In contrast, existentialism centers on consciousness, freedom, and personal responsibility. As Michael Guy Thompson (2016) highlights in Essays in Existential Psychoanalysis, existential psychoanalysis diverges from traditional psychoanalysis by emphasizing the individual’s conscious engagement with life and their ability to choose. This philosophical divide has created an ongoing dialogue between the two disciplines, but it has also led to misunderstandings.

Sartre, perhaps more than any other existential philosopher, has had a complex relationship with psychoanalysis. While his ideas have not deeply influenced clinicians in general, existential psychoanalysts have found his work crucial for rethinking the foundations of therapeutic practice. Sartre’s existential critiques, especially his thoughts on freedom and responsibility, have provided a unique perspective that informs how existential psychoanalysts understand their patients and guide therapy (Thompson, 2016).

Sartre’s Influence on Existential Psychoanalysis

Jean-Paul Sartre’s influence on existential psychoanalysis is both deep and personal. In Being and Nothingness, Sartre lays out a framework for understanding human freedom that has profoundly impacted existential psychoanalysts. Sartre believed that human beings are fundamentally free, and much of our psychological suffering stems from our refusal to confront this freedom. Unlike Freud, who emphasized unconscious drives that control behavior, Sartre focused on the choices we make and the responsibility for those choices (Thompson, 2016).

Thompson (2016) explores how Sartre distinguishes between reflective and pre-reflective consciousness, a central component of Sartre’s critique of the unconscious. Pre-reflective consciousness refers to the immediate, lived experience of our actions and feelings, where we are aware of our choices but have not yet reflected on them. Reflective consciousness, on the other hand, involves stepping back to evaluate or acknowledge these choices. For Sartre, much of human behavior operates at the pre-reflective level, meaning that individuals are aware of their actions, but may not explicitly acknowledge or examine them.

This distinction helps Sartre challenge Freud’s notion of the unconscious. Freud posited that repressed, unconscious forces drive much of our behavior without our awareness. In contrast, Sartre argued that people are always aware—at least pre-reflectively—of their choices and actions. According to Sartre, what Freud called the unconscious is not truly unconscious; rather, it consists of choices or actions that we avoid acknowledging in order to evade responsibility. Sartre’s concept of bad faith describes this avoidance, where individuals deceive themselves to escape the weight of their freedom and responsibility (Thompson, 2016).

Freedom and Responsibility in Therapy

Sartre’s concept of freedom is central to existential psychoanalysis. According to Sartre, we are “condemned to be free,” meaning that we are constantly making choices, whether we like it or not. This freedom, however, comes with responsibility—a responsibility that many people try to evade. In Essays in Existential Psychoanalysis, Thompson (2016) explores how Sartre’s understanding of freedom challenges traditional psychoanalytic approaches, which often see patients as victims of unconscious forces. Instead, existential psychoanalysts, drawing on Sartre, focus on helping patients recognize their freedom, even when that freedom comes with existential anxiety.

While Sartre believed that individuals must confront their tendency to avoid responsibility through bad faith, he did not specifically advocate for therapy as the primary means to achieve this. Instead, Sartre saw the recognition of one’s freedom as a philosophical and existential challenge. Therapy, from an existential perspective, can help patients engage with this task, but its role is to support patients in understanding their choices rather than offering solutions (Thompson, 2016).

The Influence of R.D. Laing on Existential Psychoanalysis

One of the most significant figures to integrate Sartre’s ideas into clinical practice was R.D. Laing, a Scottish psychiatrist whose work on schizophrenia revolutionized the field in the 1960s and 1970s. Laing viewed mental illness not simply as a biological disorder, but as a reflection of an individual’s struggle with their own freedom. According to Thompson (2016), Laing’s The Divided Self can be seen as an integration of Sartre’s existential psychoanalysis with object relations theory.

Laing’s approach marked a departure from traditional psychoanalysis, as he emphasized understanding the subjective experience of those with mental illness. Like Sartre, Laing believed that even individuals experiencing extreme psychological distress must be understood in the context of their relationships and choices. His work serves as an example of how Sartre’s existential philosophy can be applied in a therapeutic setting, encouraging clinicians to focus on the patient’s experience of freedom and responsibility (Thompson, 2016).

Sartre’s Critique of Freud’s Unconscious

A key aspect of Sartre’s critique of Freud’s theory of the unconscious lies in his rejection of the idea that there are multiple agencies, such as the id, ego, and superego, controlling human behavior. Sartre challenged the notion that anything other than the individual is responsible for their actions. He argued that positing separate psychic agencies implies that behavior is caused by something other than the person themselves. Sartre believed that people are fully responsible for their choices, even when they avoid acknowledging them.

Thompson (2016) explains that Sartre’s distinction between reflective and pre-reflective consciousness is crucial to understanding this critique. Pre-reflective consciousness refers to our immediate awareness of choices and actions, even if we don’t explicitly reflect on them. Sartre argued that what Freud referred to as the unconscious is not a separate, hidden force, but rather choices and actions that we fail to acknowledge because doing so would confront us with our freedom and responsibility. Sartre’s concept of bad faith—the idea that individuals deceive themselves to avoid facing the truth of their freedom—underscores his rejection of the idea that any unconscious agency drives human behavior (Thompson, 2016).

This critique ultimately reframes what Freud called the unconscious. Rather than assuming that human beings are driven by repressed, unknown desires, Sartre argues that we are aware of our motivations on some level but choose to ignore or suppress them through bad faith. For Sartre, psychoanalysis must engage with these pre-reflective choices, helping individuals recognize and take responsibility for their actions (Thompson, 2016).

Freedom and Change in the Therapeutic Process

Sartre’s existential psychoanalysis provides a powerful framework for understanding change in therapy. As Thompson (2016) notes, Sartre’s focus on freedom encourages patients to confront how they avoid responsibility in their lives. However, Sartre did not suggest that therapy alone can help individuals live more authentically. The role of therapy in existential psychoanalysis is to guide patients toward recognizing their freedom and taking responsibility for their actions, rather than trying to unearth hidden drives or uncover a “true self,” a concept that Sartre rejected. For Sartre, we constantly create and recreate ourselves through our actions; there is no fixed essence or predetermined “self” to be discovered (Thompson, 2016).


Conclusion

The relationship between existentialism and psychoanalysis has not always been smooth, but thinkers like Jean-Paul Sartre and R.D. Laing have shown how these two fields can come together to offer a deeper understanding of the human condition. Sartre’s emphasis on freedom and responsibility provides existential psychoanalysts with a framework for helping patients confront the choices they make and the responsibility they carry for their lives. At the Free Association Clinic for Existential Psychoanalysis, we draw from these rich philosophical traditions to guide our therapeutic practice, helping patients explore their freedom and engage more authentically with their lives.


James Norwood, PsyD

Associate Director, New School for Existential Psychoanalysis
Clinical Director, The Free Association Clinic for Existential Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis
Founder/CEO, inpersontherapy.com

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Husserl, E. (1982). Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy (F. Kersten, Trans.). Martinus Nijhoff.
Kierkegaard, S. (1980). The Sickness Unto Death (H. V. Hong & E. H. Hong, Trans.). Princeton University Press. (Original work published 1849)
Laing, R. D. (1965). The Divided Self: An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness. Penguin Books.
Nietzsche, F. (1966). Beyond Good and Evil (W. Kaufmann, Trans.). Vintage Books.
Sartre, J.-P. (1956). Being and Nothingness (H. Barnes, Trans.). Washington Square Press.
Thompson, M. G. (2016). Essays in Existential Psychoanalysis. Routledge.