Heidegger’s View of Language in Psychoanalysis: Logos, Truth, and Creativity

Heidegger’s View of Language in Psychoanalysis: Logos, Truth, and Creativity

A Reflection on Michael Guy Thompson’s Essays in Existential Psychoanalysis

Reflection:

In a culture saturated with messaging, podcasts, headlines, and constant explanation, it is easy to assume that language is mainly a tool. We use it to report, to persuade, to clarify, to manage. Consider even the recent advent of AI which furnishes answers rather than questions, and certainty rather than thinking (even when it’s wrong!). Then you step into therapy, and something stranger happens. A sentence that sounded simple in your head becomes hard to say out loud. A familiar story suddenly feels uncertain. Silence has weight.

In Chapter 3 of Essays in Existential Psychoanalysis, Michael Guy Thompson turns to Martin Heidegger to explore Heidegger’s view of language in psychoanalysis, and why the “talking cure” is not primarily about exchanging information (Thompson, 2024). It is about truth, creativity, and the rare experience of letting words reveal what we did not know we were protecting ourselves from.

“To undergo an experience … means that this something befalls us, strikes us, overwhelms and transforms us.” (Heidegger, 1971, p. 57)

Heidegger’s view of language in psychoanalysis, a quiet therapy room

Heidegger’s view of language in psychoanalysis: from representation to revelation

One of Heidegger’s central objections is that we often treat language as if it were a neutral system of labels. On this view, words simply “stand for” things. They are signs, and the real world sits behind them like an object behind glass.

Thompson suggests that this representational approach is not only philosophically thin, it can become clinically misleading (Thompson, 2024). If language is merely a container for facts, then therapy becomes a hunt for the right explanation. The goal becomes a correct report about the past, a correct diagnosis, a correct insight.

Heidegger points in a different direction. Language is not only something we use. It is also the place where we live our lives with others, and where we become intelligible to ourselves (Heidegger, 1971; Thompson, 2024). In that sense, language is not simply descriptive. It is disclosive.
This matters in the consulting room, because what brings people to therapy is rarely a simple lack of information. Many people already know the “facts” of their history. The difficulty is that the facts are relegated to information that is not experienced. The person can speak about what happened, but they cannot yet speak from within what happened. The difference is subtle, and it is often the difference between reciting and revealing.

Undergoing an experience with language: why therapy is not just communication

Thompson highlights a distinction in Heidegger that resonates with psychoanalysis: the difference between using language functionally and actually experiencing language (Thompson, 2024). We can speak all day without being touched by what speech is doing.
In everyday life, language is often practical. We schedule. We negotiate. We summarize. Even when we describe feelings, we can do so in ways that keep those feelings safely at a distance.

Heidegger argues that an experience with language, the form that involves an undergoing, is not automatic. It is something we can resist, and something that can overwhelm us when we stop resisting (Heidegger, 1971; Thompson, 2024). In a psychoanalytic setting, this becomes recognizable. Patients are invited to speak with no particular aim in mind, a stance closely associated with Freud’s conception of free association. The point is not to produce the “right” story. The point is to make room for what language brings forward when we stop forcing it to behave.

This also helps explain why therapy can feel oddly risky, even when the topic seems ordinary. Words can carry more than we intend. We can discover that our usual explanations have been serving as a shield. And when that shield loosens, what appears is not just information, but a new kind of contact with ourselves.

language as self-disclosure in psychoanalytic therapy

Logos, listening, and the difference between conversation and chatter

Thompson follows Heidegger into the older meanings of logos, tracing how the word is connected to gathering, arranging, and being heard (Thompson, 2024). This is not just linguistic trivia. It is a way of getting to the roots of what language most essentially is.
In this view, speaking is not simply transmitting content. It is a kind of gathering, a bringing-together of a life into words. A story is not only a report. It is an attempt to make experience hold together.

But Heidegger also warns that much of what passes for talk is a defense against genuine dialogue. Thompson emphasizes Heidegger’s critique of what he calls idle chatter, the kind of speech that circulates without depth, without risk, without real listening (Thompson, 2024). We talk about things, but we do not truly speak to one another.

In the consulting room, this distinction becomes clinically significant. Many people arrive with highly practiced ways of speaking. They can describe their relationships, their work, their symptoms, their childhood. Yet something in the speech feels curiously untouched, as if the person is narrating from a distance.

The shift is not something the therapist “listens for” like a technician. It is something that happens to the person speaking. A familiar account can suddenly lose its polish. Words that used to feel like a report begin to press back on the speaker, and the speaker is forced to endure what is being said.
When that occurs, the analytic hour is no longer about describing life from a distance. It becomes one of the places where life is actually lived. There is a different kind of closeness here, not sentimental intimacy, but the seriousness of being encountered by what is real, in the presence of another person.


Creativity as revelation: what art teaches the analytic hour

A striking move in Thompson’s chapter is the bridge from language to creativity. He draws on Heidegger’s claim that art is not simply decoration or self-expression. Art is a site where truth happens (Heidegger, 1971; Thompson, 2024).

This is a challenging idea, and it becomes easier to grasp if we think of creativity less as talent and more as revelation. A work of art can show something real about human existence, something we did not have words for, until we encountered it. In that sense, creativity is not a luxury. It is one of the ways reality becomes visible.

Thompson suggests that psychoanalysis has a parallel structure (Thompson, 2024). The point is not to manufacture clever interpretations. The point is to let something concealed become unconcealed through speech, through association, through the slow formation of meaning over time.

This is why psychoanalysis is sometimes described as a creative process. Not because it asks patients to be artists, but because it asks them to participate in an unfolding. As language gathers experience, new connections appear. Not all at once. Not on command. Often indirectly.

In that way, the analytic hour can be understood as a kind of work, a living act of making sense. The creativity is not in inventing a prettier narrative. The creativity is in allowing a truer one to take shape.

Poetry and dwelling: making room for what wants to be said

Thompson returns to Heidegger’s deep interest in poetry, and to a famous line associated with Hölderlin: “poetically, man dwells” (Thompson, 2024). For Heidegger, poetry is not an escape from reality. It is a way of dwelling with reality, of staying close to what is most difficult to say.

This offers a quiet critique of contemporary life. In the information age, we often treat words as consumable, and we treat meaning as something we can quickly acquire. Thompson echoes Heidegger’s concern that modern culture can become numbing, full of stimuli that mimic insight without requiring transformation (Thompson, 2024).

Therapy can be a counter-space. A place to slow down. A place where the pressure to perform coherence relaxes, and where it becomes possible to sit with experience long enough for it to speak back.

Thompson also makes a clinical point that can feel almost subversive: the more the therapist tries to get ahead of language with rigid plans and strategies, the more language becomes estranged, and the less likely the patient is to find their own way through suffering (Thompson, 2024). This does not mean therapy lacks structure. It means that the structure is meant to protect a certain kind of openness, an openness where words can arrive from somewhere deeper than intention.

truth and creativity in Heidegger’s philosophy of language

What this means for clients and clinicians in training

This chapter has a simple but demanding implication: language in therapy is not just a vehicle, it is part of the treatment.

For prospective clients, that can be reassuring. You do not need to arrive with the perfect narrative. You do not need to know what is “important” before you speak. Often what matters most is what you keep skipping over, what you say too quickly, what you cannot quite put into words, and what you feel tempted to turn into a joke.

For clinicians in training, Thompson’s reading of Heidegger is not an invitation to collect “listening skills” or to watch for cues like a technician. It is an invitation to take seriously the way language usually withholds itself and then, at certain points, breaks through.

Much of ordinary speech is functional, managerial, explanatory. It keeps experience organized at a safe distance. But when someone is actually undergoing what they are saying, that functional surface can begin to fail. Words arrive that feel inconvenient, embarrassing, too sharp, or too intimate. The person speaking may hesitate, lose the thread, repeat themselves, or fall silent. None of this needs to be treated as a trick to decode. It is often the very place where language, no longer merely used, begins to be endured.

And meaning, in this sense, is not something imposed from above. It gathers over time. A phrase recurs. A topic is reliably avoided. A familiar story keeps returning but changes its shape. Slowly, the hour collects its own vocabulary, until the person can finally speak from within what they have been saying all along.

If you are a clinician interested in developing this kind of listening, our training program in existential psychoanalysis is designed to support that depth of clinical work.


Conclusion

In Chapter 3, Thompson uses Heidegger to clarify why psychoanalysis takes language so seriously. Words are not only carriers of information. They are events. They reveal, they conceal, they gather, they disrupt, and sometimes they transform (Thompson, 2024). Logos, in this sense, is not a theory to apply, it is something to listen for.

When therapy is at its best, it offers a rare form of conversation, one that moves beyond idle chatter toward truthfulness and mutual recognition. It also treats creativity as part of healing, not creativity as performance, but creativity as the slow emergence of what is real.

At the Free Association Clinic, our work in psychoanalytic therapy and existential therapy makes room for this kind of careful dialogue. If you would like to explore whether this approach fits what you are seeking, you can contact the Free Association Clinic.


James Norwood, PsyD
Associate Director, New School for Existential Psychoanalysis (https://www.freeassociation.us)
Clinical Director, The Free Association Clinic for Existential Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis (https://www.freeassociationclinic.com)
Founder/CEO, inpersontherapy.com (https://inpersontherapy.com)

References

Heidegger, M. (1971). On the Way to Language (P. D. Hertz, Trans.). Harper & Row.
Heidegger, M. (1971). Poetry, Language, Thought (A. Hofstadter, Trans.). Harper & Row.
Thompson, M. G. (2024). Essays in Existential Psychoanalysis: On the Primacy of Authenticity. Routledge.


James Norwood, PsyD
Associate Director, New School for Existential Psychoanalysis (https://www.freeassociation.us)
Clinical Director, The Free Association Clinic for Existential Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis (https://www.freeassociationclinic.com)
Founder/CEO, inpersontherapy.com (https://inpersontherapy.com)

Heidegger, M. (1971). On the Way to Language (P. D. Hertz, Trans.). Harper & Row.
Heidegger, M. (1971). Poetry, Language, Thought (A. Hofstadter, Trans.). Harper & Row.
Thompson, M. G. (1985). The Death of Desire: A Study in Psychopathology. New York University Press.
Thompson, M. G. (1994). The Truth About Freud’s Technique: The Encounter with the Real. New York University Press.
Thompson, M. G. (1998, January). The Fundamental Rule of Psychoanalysis. The Psychoanalytic Review, 85(1).
Thompson, M. G. (2024). Essays in Existential Psychoanalysis: On the Primacy of Authenticity. Routledge.

Freedom and Responsibility in Existential Psychoanalysis: Sartre’s Influence on Clinical Practice

Freedom and Responsibility in Existential Psychoanalysis:
Sartre’s Influence on Clinical Practice

A Reflection on Michael Guy Thompson’s
Essays in Existential Psychoanalysis

The relationship between psychoanalysis and existentialism has long been marked by tension. Psychoanalysis, particularly in its Freudian form, delves into the unconscious, focusing on hidden drives and repressed desires that shape behavior. In contrast, existentialism centers on consciousness, freedom, and personal responsibility. As Michael Guy Thompson (2016) highlights in Essays in Existential Psychoanalysis, existential psychoanalysis diverges from traditional psychoanalysis by emphasizing the individual’s conscious engagement with life and their ability to choose. This philosophical divide has created an ongoing dialogue between the two disciplines, but it has also led to misunderstandings.

Sartre, perhaps more than any other existential philosopher, has had a complex relationship with psychoanalysis. While his ideas have not deeply influenced clinicians in general, existential psychoanalysts have found his work crucial for rethinking the foundations of therapeutic practice. Sartre’s existential critiques, especially his thoughts on freedom and responsibility, have provided a unique perspective that informs how existential psychoanalysts understand their patients and guide therapy (Thompson, 2016).

Sartre’s Influence on Existential Psychoanalysis

Jean-Paul Sartre’s influence on existential psychoanalysis is both deep and personal. In Being and Nothingness, Sartre lays out a framework for understanding human freedom that has profoundly impacted existential psychoanalysts. Sartre believed that human beings are fundamentally free, and much of our psychological suffering stems from our refusal to confront this freedom. Unlike Freud, who emphasized unconscious drives that control behavior, Sartre focused on the choices we make and the responsibility for those choices (Thompson, 2016).

Thompson (2016) explores how Sartre distinguishes between reflective and pre-reflective consciousness, a central component of Sartre’s critique of the unconscious. Pre-reflective consciousness refers to the immediate, lived experience of our actions and feelings, where we are aware of our choices but have not yet reflected on them. Reflective consciousness, on the other hand, involves stepping back to evaluate or acknowledge these choices. For Sartre, much of human behavior operates at the pre-reflective level, meaning that individuals are aware of their actions, but may not explicitly acknowledge or examine them.

This distinction helps Sartre challenge Freud’s notion of the unconscious. Freud posited that repressed, unconscious forces drive much of our behavior without our awareness. In contrast, Sartre argued that people are always aware—at least pre-reflectively—of their choices and actions. According to Sartre, what Freud called the unconscious is not truly unconscious; rather, it consists of choices or actions that we avoid acknowledging in order to evade responsibility. Sartre’s concept of bad faith describes this avoidance, where individuals deceive themselves to escape the weight of their freedom and responsibility (Thompson, 2016).

Freedom and Responsibility in Therapy

Sartre’s concept of freedom is central to existential psychoanalysis. According to Sartre, we are “condemned to be free,” meaning that we are constantly making choices, whether we like it or not. This freedom, however, comes with responsibility—a responsibility that many people try to evade. In Essays in Existential Psychoanalysis, Thompson (2016) explores how Sartre’s understanding of freedom challenges traditional psychoanalytic approaches, which often see patients as victims of unconscious forces. Instead, existential psychoanalysts, drawing on Sartre, focus on helping patients recognize their freedom, even when that freedom comes with existential anxiety.

While Sartre believed that individuals must confront their tendency to avoid responsibility through bad faith, he did not specifically advocate for therapy as the primary means to achieve this. Instead, Sartre saw the recognition of one’s freedom as a philosophical and existential challenge. Therapy, from an existential perspective, can help patients engage with this task, but its role is to support patients in understanding their choices rather than offering solutions (Thompson, 2016).

The Influence of R.D. Laing on Existential Psychoanalysis

One of the most significant figures to integrate Sartre’s ideas into clinical practice was R.D. Laing, a Scottish psychiatrist whose work on schizophrenia revolutionized the field in the 1960s and 1970s. Laing viewed mental illness not simply as a biological disorder, but as a reflection of an individual’s struggle with their own freedom. According to Thompson (2016), Laing’s The Divided Self can be seen as an integration of Sartre’s existential psychoanalysis with object relations theory.

Laing’s approach marked a departure from traditional psychoanalysis, as he emphasized understanding the subjective experience of those with mental illness. Like Sartre, Laing believed that even individuals experiencing extreme psychological distress must be understood in the context of their relationships and choices. His work serves as an example of how Sartre’s existential philosophy can be applied in a therapeutic setting, encouraging clinicians to focus on the patient’s experience of freedom and responsibility (Thompson, 2016).

Sartre’s Critique of Freud’s Unconscious

A key aspect of Sartre’s critique of Freud’s theory of the unconscious lies in his rejection of the idea that there are multiple agencies, such as the id, ego, and superego, controlling human behavior. Sartre challenged the notion that anything other than the individual is responsible for their actions. He argued that positing separate psychic agencies implies that behavior is caused by something other than the person themselves. Sartre believed that people are fully responsible for their choices, even when they avoid acknowledging them.

Thompson (2016) explains that Sartre’s distinction between reflective and pre-reflective consciousness is crucial to understanding this critique. Pre-reflective consciousness refers to our immediate awareness of choices and actions, even if we don’t explicitly reflect on them. Sartre argued that what Freud referred to as the unconscious is not a separate, hidden force, but rather choices and actions that we fail to acknowledge because doing so would confront us with our freedom and responsibility. Sartre’s concept of bad faith—the idea that individuals deceive themselves to avoid facing the truth of their freedom—underscores his rejection of the idea that any unconscious agency drives human behavior (Thompson, 2016).

This critique ultimately reframes what Freud called the unconscious. Rather than assuming that human beings are driven by repressed, unknown desires, Sartre argues that we are aware of our motivations on some level but choose to ignore or suppress them through bad faith. For Sartre, psychoanalysis must engage with these pre-reflective choices, helping individuals recognize and take responsibility for their actions (Thompson, 2016).

Freedom and Change in the Therapeutic Process

Sartre’s existential psychoanalysis provides a powerful framework for understanding change in therapy. As Thompson (2016) notes, Sartre’s focus on freedom encourages patients to confront how they avoid responsibility in their lives. However, Sartre did not suggest that therapy alone can help individuals live more authentically. The role of therapy in existential psychoanalysis is to guide patients toward recognizing their freedom and taking responsibility for their actions, rather than trying to unearth hidden drives or uncover a “true self,” a concept that Sartre rejected. For Sartre, we constantly create and recreate ourselves through our actions; there is no fixed essence or predetermined “self” to be discovered (Thompson, 2016).


Conclusion

The relationship between existentialism and psychoanalysis has not always been smooth, but thinkers like Jean-Paul Sartre and R.D. Laing have shown how these two fields can come together to offer a deeper understanding of the human condition. Sartre’s emphasis on freedom and responsibility provides existential psychoanalysts with a framework for helping patients confront the choices they make and the responsibility they carry for their lives. At the Free Association Clinic for Existential Psychoanalysis, we draw from these rich philosophical traditions to guide our therapeutic practice, helping patients explore their freedom and engage more authentically with their lives.


James Norwood, PsyD

Associate Director, New School for Existential Psychoanalysis
Clinical Director, The Free Association Clinic for Existential Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis
Founder/CEO, inpersontherapy.com

Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and Time (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Trans.). Harper & Row.
Husserl, E. (1982). Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy (F. Kersten, Trans.). Martinus Nijhoff.
Kierkegaard, S. (1980). The Sickness Unto Death (H. V. Hong & E. H. Hong, Trans.). Princeton University Press. (Original work published 1849)
Laing, R. D. (1965). The Divided Self: An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness. Penguin Books.
Nietzsche, F. (1966). Beyond Good and Evil (W. Kaufmann, Trans.). Vintage Books.
Sartre, J.-P. (1956). Being and Nothingness (H. Barnes, Trans.). Washington Square Press.
Thompson, M. G. (2016). Essays in Existential Psychoanalysis. Routledge.